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ABSTRACT 
Military family housing programs are in crisis, the product of a policy-strategy 
mismatch resulting from competing interests among the United States Congress, 
Department of Defense, private real-estate developers, and the military members and 
families who rely on military housing. Through a policy-centered literature review, 
survey instrument, and analysis, this thesis investigates the mismatch and its impacts on 
military member and family health and readiness. Responses to this study’s survey and 
research sample suggest that few differences exist between respondents of military family 
housing and residents of local civilian community housing, with the most significant 
supported finding being that military housing respondents’ air-filtration maintenance 
occurs less often than that of local community housing. The overall findings suggest that 
the survey instrument, with minor improvements, could be used to acquire accurate and 
actionable data related to occupant health, well-being, and readiness, with the intrinsic 
benefit of serving as a rubric to gauge achievement of current housing and readiness 
policies. Succinctly put, the study’s survey instrument could easily be used by housing 
tenants, providers, and support staff as a near-definitive physical inspection diagnostic 
tool to identify physically observable indicators and building assemblage characteristics 
commonly observed, known, and associated with unsafe and unhealthy housing 
conditions.
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Our installations remain critical components of our ability to fight and win 
wars. Our warfighters cannot do their job without bases from which to fight, 
on which to train, or in which to live when they are not deployed. Our 
installations support our families — many of which live there and all of 
which use their support services. The bottom line is that installations 
support our military readiness. Our primary focus in our FY 2018 budget 
request is to ensure that our military installations are capable of supporting 
the missions of our forces, today and in the future. 
—Statement of Mr. Peter Potochney Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(EI&E) before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 2017, p. 1. 
 
A. STUDY OVERVIEW 
Since 1775, the military services have had an enduring mission to defend the 
security of the United States. More than 245 years later, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
is charged with the duty and responsibility of ensuring the sovereignty of this great nation 
and has been since the signing of the National Security Act of 1947. The department seeks 
to accomplish its primary mission first through deterring war by providing the requisite 
combat-credible military forces necessary to ensure the president of the United States and 
U.S. diplomats negotiate U.S. terms of diplomacy from a position of strength. However, 
should deterrence fail, the service members of the United States Army (USA), Marine 
Corps (USMC), Navy (USN), Air Force (USAF), and as prescribed by higher authorities, 
Coast Guard (USCG) stand poised. The nation’s military services are prepared; they have 
been adequately manned and organized with warfighters appropriately trained and 
equipped to address emerging challenges, resolve conflict, and if necessary, win wars. 
What if this is not the case? 
Numerous Reuters, Military Family Advisory Network (MFAN), Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), and DOD Inspector General (DODIG) reports citing unsafe 
and unhealthy military housing conditions have recently garnered Congressional and 
DOD-wide concerns that military service member and family health and welfare is being 
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jeopardized by “painfully inadequate living conditions” in military housing as noted by 
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Ranking Member, Senator Reed (Hearing to 
receive testimony, 2019, p. 6). The conditions described in these reports are prejudicial to 
U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) initiatives 
and contravene myriads of current DOD and service-specific directives and policies. 
Examples and explanations of these issues are covered in this study for demonstrational 
purposes. Given the historic positive correlation between the condition of military family 
housing (MFH) and DOD readiness (Statement of Mr. Peter Potochney Acting Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (EI&E) before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 2017,  
p. 1), the threat and risk to National Defense are real, the concerns of Congress, DOD 
leadership, and the American people warranted. 
This study focuses on both identifying, as well as prioritizing, key housing and 
readiness program policy objectives and analyzing the strategies in place to achieve policy 
objective desired end states. Measurement tools, techniques, and rubrics will also be 
evaluated. This analysis, in theory, will highlight factors and circumstances principally 
responsible for the inadequate living conditions of MFH as noted by Senator Reed and 
echoed by the committee members of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (Hearing 
to receive testimony, 2019). Lastly, this study aims to understand the impacts to service 
member and family health and well-being to better gauge the overall effects to force 
readiness. This information will provide policymakers, decision-makers, and program 
managers with improved knowledge, insight, and proven best-business practices that result 
in lasting policy, strategy, and program improvements that support today’s NDS to 
preserve the National Defense of tomorrow. 
Military housing has been supported by various funding authorities, efforts, or 
programs over the last century. Pre-1996 funding efforts are not the focus of this study but 
will be covered as needed to provide background, context, and lessons learned. 
The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) was signed into law by 
President Clinton February 11, 1996, at the DOD’s request. MHPI was the DOD’s housing 
solution to address and resolve military recruitment, retention, and readiness concerns 
(Gebicke, 1996, p. 12). The MHPI enabled the DOD to rebuild, replace, or modernize its 
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antiquated housing inventory much quicker than traditional methods through leveraging 
both private [real estate] developer capital and workforce expertise. As the DOD was able 
to provide affordable, quality military housing to its eligible beneficiaries as required by 
department policy, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4165.63 DOD Housing, the 
private developer would receive fair and equitable financial compensation for services 
rendered (Hearing to receive testimony, 2019, p. 2). Theory being, as the quality and 
availability of military housing improved, the expectation was service member recruitment, 
retention, and readiness would inherently follow suit (Gebicke, 1998, p. 2). Additionally, 
to incentivize private developers to exceed requirements, most of the MHPI projects 
included financial bonuses and awards that were payable to the private developer for 
providing above-average services (Field, 2019, p. 8) 
While initial MHPI efforts were off to a slow start (Gebicke, 1998, p. 20), MHPI 
briskly picked up its pace through the early 2000s. By February 2009, the DOD had 
privatized nearly 188,000 of its MFH units with another 31,000 units projected to be 
privatized shortly thereafter. By the end of 2012, 98% of the department’s housing 
inventory was projected to be privatized (Lepore, 2009, p. 18). 
GAO reports on the MHPI over the last decade demonstrate that the DOD achieved 
its goal of privatizing 99% of its MFH. Unfortunately, these same GAO reports also show 
the MHPI is beleaguered with various data and reporting discrepancies, financial 
challenges, and fraud-prone business practices and processes (Field, 2019, pp. 5–14). 
These GAO reports are concerning given that an underperforming MHPI project can 
negatively impact service member and military family health and well-being, and 
detrimentally degrade a supporting unit’s ability to provide critical instillation services, 
support, and logistics. Either or both circumstances result in unnecessary negative impacts 
to installation mission success. Ultimately, overall military readiness is degraded, and 
combat effectiveness is diminished. Further supporting the MHPI without instituting 
appropriate measures of reform and accountability is synonymous with accepting 
unnecessary risk and is prejudicial to DOD principles.  
The 2018 NDS calls for three lines of effort (LOE) in support of (ISO) Pillar III of 
the 2017 NSS: 
4 
1. Rebuild military readiness and enhance warfighter lethality. 
2. Attract new like-minded strategic partners, strengthening current alliances. 
3. Improve Enterprise processes; create fiscal efficiency and improve results. 
This study will use a policy-based approach centered on NSS and NDS strategic 
initiatives to both identify and prioritize key housing and readiness program policy 
objectives and analyze the strategies in place to achieve program and policy objective 
desired end states. Measurement tools, techniques, and rubrics will also be evaluated for 
suitability. Additionally, this study designs, develops, and conducts its own policy-based 
survey designed to acquire objective feedback regarding respondent’s current housing, 
health, and well-being to better gauge the overall effects to readiness. 
B. BACKGROUND 
While military housing has been supported or provided by various funding 
authorities, efforts, or programs over the last century, key traits of those funding 
mechanisms serve as hallmarks for identifying and dividing the last 100 years of military 
housing into two separate and distinct “eras.” Beginning first with the World War to pre-
1996 era programs, regardless of the means, authority, or entity that constructed and/or 
managed the housing unit(s), the entirety of the military housing inventory was essentially 
viewed as government-owned and government-controlled (GOGC), which included 
government-leased housing (Reishauer, 1993, p. 1). The pre-1996 era is not the focus of 
this study but will be used to provide background, context, and lessons learned. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the department was afflicted with unstable 
government budgets, military base closures, and low service member morale. Ultimately, 
poor service member recruitment and retention rates were among the department’s highest 
concerns. The DOD conducted numerous studies that ultimately determined substandard 
and antiquated military housing was detrimentally impacting the department’s ability to 
recruit and retain enough service members to maintain the force resulting in reduced 
military readiness (Marsh, 1995, p. 15–16). 
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In 1996, Congress passed, and the President of the United States signed, the MHPI 
into law at the DOD’s request. The MHPI was the DOD’s housing solution. In theory, the 
MHPI would rebuild, replace, or modernize its antiquated housing inventory much quicker 
than traditional methods by leveraging both private real estate developer capital and 
expertise. As the DOD was able to provide affordable, quality housing to its eligible 
beneficiaries as required by department policy, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 
4165.63 DOD Housing, the private developer would receive fair and equitable financial 
compensation for their services (Hearing to receive testimony, 2018, p. 2., Chairman 
Inhofe). Consequently, as the quality and availability of military housing improves, service 
member recruitment and retention, and readiness would follow suit (Gebicke, 1998, p. 2). 
Additionally, to incentivize private developers to exceed expectations (theoretically further 
enhancing readiness, most of the MHPI projects included financial bonuses and awards 
that were payable to the private developer for providing above-average services (Field, 
2019, p. 8) 
Initial MHPI efforts were off to a slow start (Gebicke, 1998, p. 20), but briskly 
picked up pace through the early 2000s. By February 2009, the DOD had privatized nearly 
188,000 MFH units with another 31,000 units projected to be privatized by the close of 
2012 amounting to 98%of its housing inventory being privatized (Lepore, 2009, p. 2). 
GAO reports on the MHPI over the last decade demonstrate the DOD succeeded in 
achieving its goal of privatizing 99% of its MFH. Unfortunately, these same GAO reports 
also show the MHPI is beleaguered with various data and reporting discrepancies, financial 
challenges, and fraud-prone business practices and processes. These GAO reports are 
concerning given that an underperforming MHPI project can detract from service member 
or military family health and well-being, or worse, degrade a supporting unit’s ability to 
provide critical instillation services or logistics, resulting in a negative impact on 
installation mission success, ultimately degrading overall military readiness. Additionally, 
2019 and 2020 GAO reports to include U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing 
testimony demonstrate that not only did many of the private developers who are the helm 
of the MHPI projects fail to meet the minimum performance requirements, many if not 
most of them still received incentive or performance awards that were not warranted based 
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on reports of health, life, safety or other form of violation (Field, 2020a, p. 7). If current 
measurements and indicators are of little to no value in determining a measurable indication 
of MHPI project success as it relates to achieving military housing and readiness 
objectives, a thorough review of department housing and readiness policies and directives 
is necessary to identify best sources of measurement and indicators for gauging the 
achievement of housing and readiness policy desired end states. Given one third of the 
department’s service members historically reside in privatized housing, there is significant 
risk the DOD’s actual readiness could be much lower than initially reported since the DOD 
currently has no reliable means of acquiring this data across the force. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The military family housing program is currently in crisis, the product of a policy-
strategy-mismatch that has resulted from the competing interests among the DOD, private 
real estate developers, and the military families that rely on MFH. This policy-strategy-
mismatch is characterized by policies that fail to establish clear objectives and priorities 
resulting in misaligned strategies that have failed to provide safe, affordable, quality 
military family housing. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Research Objective 
This study aims to identify and prioritize key housing and readiness program policy 
objectives and analyzing the strategies in place to achieve policy objectives. Measurement 
tools, techniques, and rubrics will also be evaluated for suitability and establishment of 
best practices. Additionally, this study seeks to identify common causal housing factors 
that affect military member and family readiness. Analysis that results in a high correlation 
could be used to assist program managers, policymakers and decision-makers to identify, 
develop, and institute controls that resolves or mitigates the probability and severity of the 
risk and threat of negative impacts to military readiness caused by unsafe, unhealthy, or 
uninhabitable MFH. 
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2. Research Question 
Have housing and family readiness program policy-strategy-mismatches impacted 
the health, well being, and readiness of service members and their families? 
E. SCOPE OF RESEARCH, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope  
This study briefly reviews military housing’s history. Pre-MHPI military housing 
funding efforts are discussed sparingly and only as needed to add background, context, and 
lessons learned. Evaluating the MHPI’s role in providing MFH since its 1996 inception 
and what most likely lies ahead based on the analysis of this study are the focus of this 
research. This study will evaluate and analyze the principal inputs and outputs related to 
the MHPI to identify applicable lessons learned that support development of best business 
practices and improved policy and strategy development and alignment. 
Establishment of clear, prioritized policy objectives and desired end states 
supported by strategies developed from lessons learned and best business practices that 
incentivize superior performance and disincentivize poor performance will, in theory, 
effectively mitigate delivery of substandard products and services that detract from military 
readiness thus ensuring the DOD’s ability to provide the National Defense of tomorrow. 
2. Limitations 
The responsibilities of the DOD and its branches of military service to provide 
housing for eligible personnel and dependents varies significantly on a variety of factors. 
Some of the more prevalent and larger order of magnitude factors include:  
 The branch of service the individual serves in or is employed by and 
whether the individual is assigned as Active Duty (AD), Reserve 
Component (RC), or a retired member of the Armed Forces (Army, 
Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard), or a DOD civilian 
(includes appropriated and non-appropriated funded employees, etc.). This 
study will focus solely on the AD assigned service members and their 
eligible beneficiaries. 
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 The geographic location the service member is assigned (inside or outside 
the Continental United States; CONUS or OCONUS, respectively). 
 The individual’s assignment status as “Accompanied” (assignment 
includes eligible dependents), or “Unaccompanied” (assignment does not 
include dependents). 
 Due to limited resources, this study does not exclusively and exhaustively 
research and report on the housing characteristics associated with each of 
the factors and personnel categories. Given the historic correlation 
between the condition of MFH and service member recruitment and 
retention rates in the DOD (Statement of Mr. Peter Potochney Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (EI&E) before the U.S. Senate 
Appropriations Committee, 2017, p. 2), the focus of this study is on MFH 
and MFH tenant health, well-being, and readiness.  
 Due to time limitations this study will not acquire DOD-wide approval to 
survey all branches of the Armed Forces that receive annual National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) funded appropriations (i.e., USA, 
USN/USMC, USAF). This study will acquire Department of the Navy 
(DON) approval from the Navy Research and Survey Office, Operations 
of the Navy (OPNAV), N1, to conduct research utilizing DON personnel 
at various CONUS locations. This sampling is intended to be statistically 
relevant, generalizable, and representative of the DOD population. 
3. Assumptions 
 Adequate survey results will be received per the NPS Institutional Review 
Board (IRB)-approved research proposal. Results of this study will be 
generalizable given a CONUS-wide sampling strategy that acquires 
representative samples from each of the nine U.S. Census Bureau 
Divisions comprised of the U.S. contiguous states forming the four major 
U.S. Census Bureau Regions: West, Midwest, South, and Northeast. This 
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survey rationale is further explained in Chapter III-Methodology. (US 
Census Bureau Regions and Divisions, 2015) 
 This study will not specifically research other forms of housing provided 
by the DOD, such as “Unaccompanied Housing” (UH).  
 Factors that negatively affect MFH safety, health, and habitability result in 
a detriment to MFH tenant readiness. UH and UH tenant readiness will be 
similarly negatively affected.  
 Most MFH MHPI project agreements and land conveyances consist of 50 
year lease terms that were issued after 1996. (Schuster, 2000, p. 7)  
 MFH and MHPI project Business Agreements currently in place will 
remain in place. Major or material changes will only occur per mutual 
agreement of the parties involved or as directed by law. 
 Housing occupants and potential housing occupants will desire affordable, 
safe, healthy, habitable housing regardless of whether they reside off base 
in residences located in the local community or use on-base housing. Base 
housing occupant preferences will be provider agnostic, indiscriminate of 
DOD-owned and/or managed or Joint Venture/Public Private Venture (JV/
PPV) partnership owned and/or managed (i.e., MHPI project owned/
managed by private developers). 
 Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) entitlements will remain in effect 
and will not be materially changed. 
 Building and construction industry characteristics such as state and local 
building codes, building materials, and building practices, etc., will remain 
relatively like that of previous years with no significant changes. 
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F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
Currently, 99% of MFH has been privatized with a third of the AD armed forces 
relying on privatized MFH to keep their families safe both while the service member 
supports National Defense and readiness initiatives in garrison in preparation for 
deployment, as well as while forward-deployed (Lepore, 2018, pp. 1, 5). Ensuring MFH is 
affordable, safe, healthy, and habitable will effectively mitigate negative mission impacts 
allowing our servicemen and servicewomen to focus on their mission. 
These hallmark readiness requirements must be fully met. Otherwise, unnecessary 
risk is assumed, unnecessarily jeopardizing mission success. Accepting unnecessary risk is 
prejudicial to the department’s Operational Risk Management (ORM) framework and 
contrary to the DOD mission. This research reinforces these principles and aims to enhance 
support through strategies that provide objective analysis and enhance feedback 
mechanisms through policy-based measurement criteria to facilitate and enable immediate 
action to preserve, protect, and cultivate service member and family health, well-being, and 
readiness. 
With one third of the nation’s armed forces reliant on privatized housing, the MHPI, 
as an individual program effort, has a direct and decisive effect on the nation’s ability to 
provide the combat-credible military forces that are required to protect the sovereignty and 
security of the nation. The well-renowned credibility and capability of the United States’ 
joint forces has deterred many would-be United States adversaries, achieving, and 
maintaining peace, through strength. The current privatized military housing crisis erodes 
both the nation’s credibility as well as its capability to provide combat-credible military 
forces. End result, the United States’ credibility and capability to project power is 
diminished, and the president of the United States and the United States’ elected 
representatives lack positional strength and empowerment to negotiate U.S. terms of peace. 
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The benefits of this research supports and can affect positive change in each of the 
following three NDS LOEs (White House, 2018, p. 5): 
1. Rebuild military readiness and enhance warfighter lethality. 
 Safer, healthier homes provide: 
 Improved military member and family readiness. 
 Enhanced cognitive functions, increasing innovation, 
adaptability, lethality. 
2. Attract new like-minded strategic partners, strengthening current alliances. 
 A stronger, more lethal, and adaptable military fighting force, 
similar in values and ideologies, will attract new partner nations as 
well as new business partners. These effects alone will strengthen 
current alliances. 
3. Improve Enterprise processes; create fiscal efficiency and improve results. 
 Improved financial accountability and auditability of MHPI 
projects will create fiscal efficiencies providing improved financial 
performance across the force. As lessons learned and best business 
practices are shared across the force, the department benefits, 
creating synergistic-like increases in new available funding and 
opportunities to benefit from. 
 Given the significant percentage of discretionary government 
appropriated funds allocated to housing the department’s joint 
forces, more efficient use of DOD housing dollars has the potential 
to result in significantly increased funding for other capabilities or 
readiness programs. 
12 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
13 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We must demonstrate to our men and women in service that their quality-
of-life needs will be taken care of so that they can dedicate their full 
attention to the mission. When military members worry unduly about 
personal finances and whether their families are properly cared for, morale 
and efficiency decline with corresponding effects on retention and 
readiness. 
— Major General R. Dean Tice, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Policy and Force 
Management (Twiss & Martin, 1998, p. 38) 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1980s to early 1990s, the DOD took special note of its older, obsolete, 
and ill-maintained GOGC housing inventory (Reishauer, 1993, pp. 1–3). Based on 
preceding research and studies anchoring on the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Acquisition and Technology (OUSD A&T) Defense Science Board’s Task Force on 
Quality of Life (QoL) report published in October 1995, the DOD determined employing 
traditional military construction (MILCON) practices to replace or revitalize its current 
antiquated GOGC housing inventory would not suffice due to time and funding resource 
constraint challenges at a minimum. (Marsh, 1995, pp. 15–16) 
The DOD feared traditional housing construction strategies would consistently fail 
to provide access to affordable, quality housing with the speed and urgency required, which 
would inevitably result in the department’s inability to achieve the required recruitment 
and retention goals necessary to provide ready, combat-capable military forces. The dawn 
of the second and current era of military housing, the MHPI era, begins to take shape as 
the DOD determined it needed to look to privatization to leverage the private sector real 
estate development skills, knowledge, and abilities, but most importantly, private capital, 
to overcome the department’s housing and financial challenges. The DOD’s preferred 
solution, or as the department saw it, the only feasible solution that provided the immediate 
housing improvements the department needed, was authorized February 11, 1996, with 
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President Clinton signing the Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 Nation Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) (Gebicke, 1998, pp. 2–3). 
The signing of the FY 1996 NDAA marks the birth of MHPI. The MHPI’s principal 
objective was to enable the DOD to provide affordable, quality housing to its eligible 
beneficiaries as required by department policy. By leveraging private capital and expertise, 
MHPI was expected to accomplish its principal objective at greater speed and at reduced 
risk to readiness compared to other alternatives (e.g., MILCON). Given the fluid and 
unstable state of government funding as a result of persistent budget cuts and funding 
reallocation, utilizing traditional MILCON practices would force the DOD to accept 
significant risk (Reishauer, 1993, p. 11), which the department was avoiding at all costs. 
By leveraging private sector capital and expertise as authorized by the MHPI, the 
DOD aimed to quickly rebuild and revitalize over 200,000 existing antiquated and/or 
dilapidated MFH units at the cost of approximately $20 billion (Gebicke, 1996, pp. 2–3). 
While initial MHPI efforts were off to a slow to start (Gebicke, 1998, p. 20), MHPI briskly 
picked up its pace through the early 2000s. By February 2009, the DOD had privatized 
nearly 188,000 of its MFH units with another 31,000 units projected to be privatized by 
end of 2012 amounting to 98% of the DOD’s housing inventory being transferred to private 
companies (Lepore, 2009, p. 18). 
B. POLICY 
The following directives, instructions, manuals, laws, etc., establish requirements 
and expectations related to military service, housing, and service member and military 
family health and readiness. These mandates were identified as the prevailing influential 
policies related to this study’s housing, health, and readiness research literature review, 
many of which were principally referenced in the development of this study’s survey. 
1. 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
The President of the United States’ vision for strategic Congressional and agency-
level planning and forecasting. Government and agency heads (e.g., Congress [legislative 
branch], Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Food and Drug Administration, etc.) use this 
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strategic guidance as the basis for planning factors. Many other subordinate agencies use 
the NSS as one of their key planning and reference documents also (e.g., Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Combined Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), etc. Pillar III of the 2017 NSS, Preserve Peace Through Strength, 
calls for a renewed focus on revitalizing and rebuilding military readiness and capabilities 
(White House, 2017, p. 25). 
2. 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
The SECDEF’s strategic guidance to the leadership and service members of the 
military services. The NDS typically codifies a warfighter vision of how the DOD will 
support the nation in achieving the goals outlined in the NSS. It is not a step by step, 
checklist. Like a civilian for-profit corporation’s “Mission/Vision” statement, the NDS lays 
out how the DOD fits into and supports the NSS.  
The 2018 NDS calls for three distinct LOEs (White House, 2018, p. 5) ISO Pillar 
III of the 2017 NSS:  
1. Rebuild military readiness and enhance warfighter lethality. 
2. Attract new like-minded strategic partners, strengthening current alliances. 
3. Improve Enterprise processes; create fiscal efficiency and improve results. 
3. Oath of Office; Oath of Enlistment 
While to many in uniform the oaths represent more than just written policy, more a 
call to, and sense of, duty, the oaths are nonetheless written policy. 
Oath of Enlistment: 
I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; 
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the 
orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers 
appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. So help me God.” (Title 10, U.S. Code; Act of 5 May 1960 
replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 
October 1962). 
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Oath of Office:  
I ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; 
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this 
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and 
that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I 
am about to enter. So help me God. (Title 5 U.S. Code 3331, an individual, 
except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in 
the civil service or uniformed services). 
The intrinsic value each individual service member of the military assigns to the 
oath they take may vary; however, every branch of the military service also maintains a set 
of core values that every service member pledges strict adherence to in all that they do. 
Regardless the acronym, slogan, or phraseology used, the purpose each of the service’s 
core values serves is essentially the same: to instill pride, commitment, esprit de corps and 
to create a common and deeply shared identity founded on principles of integrity, respect, 
courage, ethics, and selflessness (DOD, 2009).  
Given the requirements of military service and the myriads of people that must 
come together at a moment’s notice and put their faith, trust, and confidence, possibly even 
their life, in the hands of someone they may hardly know, requiring these attributes requires 
little explanation. 
4. DOD Directive (DODD) 5124.02 Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) 
DODD 5124.02 is the principal source of delegated authority from the SECDEF to 
the USD(P&R); the office charged with sharing the responsibility with the SECDEF for 
Total Force Management (TFM) as it relates to the implementation of the NSS. Simply put 
this relates to both the expressed and implied duties and responsibilities associated with 
providing the appropriate human capital to implement the NSS; that the human capital 
requirements are appropriately met as it relates to their organization, manning, training, 
and equipping of U.S. service members to carry out the duties and obligations required ISO 
the NSS’ implementation.  
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The authority, or authorities, as it relates to this directive, the associated offices to 
which it applies, and further requirements of the offices, are included in United States Code 
(USC) Title 10, sections 113 and 136. CJCS Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 provides a high-
level outline and explanation of some of the associated roles and responsibilities on pages 
II-1 and II-2 (CJCS, 2020, p. 1,2). 
The relevance is that every service member in the military has in the very least a 
basic understanding of the “R-A-A” concept given it is incorporated into each of the 
service’s professional development and advancement programs:  
Responsibility. State of being accountable; see “accountability.” 
Accountability. Accountability for results; unambiguous responsibility for clearly 
established expectations for achieving specific, achievable, and measurable results (degree 
of accountability varies with the level of control or influence the individual or unit has on 
or over the results) (CJCS, 2019, p. 5). 
Authority. Most frequently refers to the legal empowerment to issue commands, 
enforce compliance, or make positionally-based decisions. An instrument, legally binding 
or otherwise, that authorizes or limits policies and directives (e.g., laws, regulations, 
Executive Orders (EO), court decisions and judicial rulings) (CJCS, 2019, p. 76). 
5. DOD Instruction (DODI) 4165.63 – DOD Housing 
This instruction serves as the principal policy guidance for DOD housing policy 
matters. All military services are subject to it as it is DOD policy, not a service-specific 
policy (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2010a). Policies set requirements and expectations, but do not typically provide 
the “how-to” guidance. (CJCS, 2019, p. 734). “Manuals” typically provide the “how-to” 
guidance, such as standard operating procedures (SOP) (CJCS, 2019, p. 915). 
In addition to assigning responsibilities for the management of DOD housing in 
accordance with (IAW) the authority it derives from other DOD Directives and mandates, 
DODI 4165.63 establishes four key DOD housing policy desired end states: 
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To ensure that eligible personnel and their families have access to affordable, quality 
housing facilities and services consistent with grade and dependent status and generally 
reflecting contemporary community living standards [emphasis added]. 
A. To ensure that eligible personnel and their families have access to 
affordable, quality housing facilities and services consistent with grade 
and dependent status and generally reflecting contemporary living 
standards [emphasis added]. 
B. To use a consistent DOD-wide analytical methodology for calculating 
the need to provide housing. 
C. That the Commander of an installation shall be responsible for the 
military housing programs with broad authority to decide the best use 
of resources to provide access to housing for eligible personnel and 
their families. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010a) 
DODI 4165.63 contains a list of 12 references included as an enclosure that provide 
additional amplifying guidance ISO ensuring compliance with these four key housing 
policies; however, there is no discernible priority or ranking established to guide a reader 
as to which references take priority over the others in the event of a conflict or constrained 
resources. See Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. DODI 4165.63 List of references. Source: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (2010a). 
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6. DOD Manual (DODM) 4165.63 – DOD Housing Management Manual 
The general “how-to” guidance for the military services regarding housing 
management. Like its sibling DODI 4165.63, the DODM also assigns responsibilities as it 
relates to DOD housing management, yet the DODM includes authorities for the 
implementation of housing policy as well as providing procedures for matters related to 
DOD housing and further establishes requirements for standardized processes across the 
military services (i.e., SOP). DODM 4165.63 provides numerous procedural instructions 
regarding how to accomplish various requirements related to supporting the four key 
housing policies specified by DODI 4165.63.  
For the housing management matters DODM 4165.63 supports either directly or 
indirectly but does not specifically cover, Enclosure (1), References, Enclosure (2), 
Responsibilities, and Enclosure (3), Procedures, are included. See Figure 2 and Figure 3.  
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Figure 2. DODM 4165.63, enclosure 1: List of references (page 1 of 2). 
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (2010b). 
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Figure 3. DODM 4165.63, enclosure 1: List of references (page 2 of 2). 
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (2010b). 
Note there are 37 supporting references listed. Between DODI 4165.63 and DODM 
4165.63 there are nearly 50 supporting references, none of which have any discernable 
prioritization as to which takes precedence over the other outside of DODI 4165.63’s fourth 
key housing policy, which is echoed by DODM 4165.63, stating that installation 
Commanders bear the responsibility for the military housing programs with which they 
have been entrusted, “… with broad authority to decide the best use of resources to provide 
access to housing for eligible personnel….”  
DODM 4165.63’s purpose and policy statements essentially mirror DODI 
4165.63’s outside of these covered exceptions. 
7. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1342.22 – Military Family Readiness 
It is commonly accepted that military families can face challenges ISO national 
defense, and that the general civilian population of the United States, while certainly not 
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devoid of challenges, is not subject to the same rigors and challenges as those associated 
with duties and obligations of military service. Hence, DODI 1342.22 serves the need and 
benefit to the military to provide for and protect military family readiness through an array 
of support services which are centrally aimed at improving service member and military 
family quality of life (QoL).  
DODI 1342.22’s purpose statement assigns responsibilities and includes the 
establishment of policies and procedures for ensuring adequate and appropriate military 
family readiness services such as relocation assistance and financial education and 
counseling. Requirements and guidelines for Emergency Family Assistance (EFA) in the 
case of emergent or all-hazard displacement are also included, as are protocols for RC 
personnel support to ensure and support surge capability should it be needed). The policy 
requirements included below are but a few of those listed in DODI 1342.22 Military Family 
Readiness: 
A. The role of personal/family life shall be incorporated into 
organizational goals related to recruitment, retention, morale, and 
operational readiness of the military force. 
B. Service members and their families have primary responsibility for 
their well-being. Family readiness services enhance Service members’ 
and families’ abilities to fulfill that responsibility. 
C. The type and level of family readiness services provided to Service 
members and their families shall be correlated to needs resulting from 
the unique challenges associated with military service across three 
domains of family readiness: 
D. (1) Mobilization and deployment readiness. 
E. (2) Mobility and financial readiness. 
F. (3) Personal and family life readiness. 
G. Promote military recruitment and retention, and support commanders’ 
ability to maintain a mission-ready force consistent with DODI 4001.1 
Installation Support. 
H. Provide compassionate, coordinated assistance and support to DOD 
personnel and their families in the event of an all-hazards incident. 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2012) 
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8. United States Code (USC) Title 10, Chapter 169, Military 
Construction (MILCON) and Military Family Housing (MFH) 
Unique to USC Title 10, Chapter 169 in comparison to the other policies is the basis 
of USC Title 10’s authority. USC Title 10 is Public Law, as passed by Congress and signed 
by the president. As with any U.S. Code, its premise and purpose is to communicate 
objectives and initiatives that Congress has expressly and specifically authorized the use 
of appropriated funds for; USC Title 10 Chapter 169 relates to supporting Military 
Construction and Military Family Housing (Military Construction and Military Family 
Housing, 2019). 
DOD policies do not carry the same level of authority as USC; therefore, DOD 
policy’s reach does not extend beyond the office which the policy was signed and published 
under. The Tenant Bill of Rights is the focus of USC Title 10 Chapter 169. See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Tenant Bill of Rights (page 1 of 2). Source: Military Construction 
and Military Family Housing (2019). 
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Note there are actually 18 Rights included in Tenant Bill of Rights, not 15. 
 
Figure 5. Tenant Bill of Rights (page 2 of 2). Source: Military Construction 
and Military Family Housing (2019). 
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9. DOD Instruction (DODI) 4001.01 – Installation Support 
DODI 40001.01 provides overarching installation management policy to ensure the 
effective and efficient alignment of assets and resources ISO the warfighter by specifying 
expected performance standards for five codified and defined categories of installation 
services and support related to installation life-cycle management:  
(1) Facilities, (2) Services, (3) Family Housing, (4) Environment, and (5) Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC).  
DODI 4000.01 outlines the following DOD policies related to the delivery of 
support and services as it relates to their associated output level standards: 
A. Provide acquisition, management, resourcing, and delivery of 
installation support to advance the overall mission of the Department 
of Defense. Installation support shall be governed to ensure DOD 
Components provide consistently high standards in support of the 
warfighting mission. 
B. Ensure that Installation Commanding Officers retain the authority to 
adjust standards to meet the morale, local quality of life, and work 
environment needs. This applies to family quality of life needs as well. 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, 2008) 
 
10. Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) 4-711-01 Family Housing 
UFC 4-711-01 is a coming together of the Army, Navy, and Air Force’s facilities 
and civil engineering authorities (i.e., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command, and Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency) to create and 
provide MFH plans, designs, processes, and procedures ISO new housing construction and 
requirements for its sustainment. Specifications and requirements related to restoration and 
modernization of existing housing stocks is also covered (Department of Defense, 2018b). 
UFC 4-711-01’s Military Family Housing goal statement is: “To provide quality-
housing neighborhoods and dwellings to contribute to a strong force of skilled people who 
provide the readiness of our Military Forces” (Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 1). 
UFC 4-711-01’s Military Family Housing objective ISO its goal statement includes 
an oath-like vow, “To bring the existing required housing inventory up to contemporary 
27 
housing standards (i.e., life safety, convenience, quality, livability, maintainability) to the 
extent practicable through repair, improvement and replacement” (Department of Defense, 
2018b, p. 1). 
Based on this literature it appears current federal, state, and residential building 
codes and designs are leveraged ISO UFC 4-711-01. The revised 2018 UFC reflects 
updates from the 2006 version to better align with modern residential construction 
standards and practices to provide safer housing units that are both more efficient as well 
as resilient (Department of Defense, 2018b, p. Summary Sheet). Notably, the construction 
of housing units and facilities with increased resiliency is also included in section 2815, 
USC Title 10 Chapter 169.  
11. National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) Research Center, 
Military Family Housing (MFH) Standards Study 
A 2001 study commissioned by the department following changes to MILCON 
authorities that eliminated decade-long size limitations on MFH. The rationale and 
justification for the abolishment of the previous long-standing limitations was to enhance 
service member and military family QoL and improve military readiness through improved 
military recruitment and retention by way of improved housing. The results of the study 
were used to establish benchmarks for the construction of housing facilities for military 
families that are comparable to (at the time) current construction, design, features, and 
accommodations found in civilian community [private sector] housing (National 
Association of Home Builders (NAHB), 2001, p. 2).  
C. STRATEGY 
Strategy is the connector, it is what bridges and narrows the gap between what 
policy says must be done (i.e., the desired end state; the objective), and where we stand 
(i.e., the current end state). The DOD Dictionary defines strategy as: “A prudent idea or set 
of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated 
fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” (CJCS, 2019, p. 927). 
As it relates to the policies covered, the objective is to ensure service members and 
their families are provided with safe and affordable quality housing. 
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1. DODM 4165.63 – DOD Housing Management Manual 
Enclosure 2 of DODM 4165.63 assigns responsibilities as prescribed and 
authorized by the authority of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD AT&L), which further assigns and redelegates duties 
and responsibilities for housing oversight and management to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment (ASD(EI&E)) (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010b, p. 7) 
At the ASD(EI&E) level, responsibility for housing oversight and management are 
shared among three offices senior to the secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force. The 
ASD(EI&E) retains principal responsibility and accountability for housing; however:  
1. The Under Secretary of Defense (COMPTROLLER)/Chief Financial Officer, 
Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO), is delegated duties for providing guidance and 
procedures related to finance, budgeting, and accounting; and, 
2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) is 
delegated responsibilities for providing policy, guidance and procedures related to 
personnel, which is then redelegated to the heads of the DOD service components 
(respective service secretaires of the armed forces).  
As reflected in the DOD directives, instructions, and manuals, the responsibility for 
ensuring service members and their eligible dependents are provided housing and readiness 
services and support is last redelegated to the cognizant Installation Commander. Enclosure 
3 of DODM 4165.63, Procedures, provides guidance and tools ISO housing requirements 
determinations, housing market analysis, operating and maintaining DOD Housing (i.e., 
GOGC housing), to include support and coordination with privatized housing projects as 
well as monitoring. 
The processes included in Enclosure 3, Procedures, may suffice provided the 
Installation Commander’s support staff is appropriately manned, trained and equipped to 
manage what appears to require unique skills, knowledge, and abilities. However, the risk 
to the installation’s mission, both directly as well as indirectly, and most importantly the 
morale and welfare of the service member and the service member’s eligible beneficiaries 
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must also be considered and weighed in the Commander’s risk assessment if this is not the 
case (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
2010b, pp. 10–34). 
DODM 4165.63 makes mention of conducting surveys pertaining to housing and 
relocation assistance on pages 16 and 35 but does not provide any discernable 
measurements or indicators of success. 
2. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report GAO-20-281 
GAO-20-281 includes four metrics used by the services to evaluate a privatized 
project’s performance (Field, 2020b, p. 19):  
 maintenance management 
 resident satisfaction 
 project safety 
 financial management 
However, the same report also explains how gross issues involving inaccurate 
reporting, inconsistent aggregation of data, using measures and metrics of success such as 
response times to start the work order, not actually whether a maintenance work order was 
physically completed or completed satisfactory, resulted in those metric’s data being 
unusable or of little to no value.  
D. MISMATCH 
First, an abbreviated summary of the policy end state requirements from Chapter 
II, Literature Review, to spotlight some of the higher priority policy end state requirements. 
1. Summary and Review of Policy Objective Desired End States 
a. DODI 4165.63 – DOD Housing: 
 To ensure that eligible personnel and their families have access to 
affordable, quality housing facilities and services consistent with 
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grade and dependent status and generally reflecting contemporary 
community living standards [emphasis added]. (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2010a) 
 That the Commander of an installation shall be responsible for the 
military housing programs with broad authority to decide the best 
use of resources to provide access to housing for eligible personnel 
and their families. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010a) 
b. DODI 1342.22 – Military Family Readiness: 
 The role of personal/family life shall be incorporated into 
organizational goals related to recruitment, retention, morale, and 
operational readiness of the military force.  
 The type and level of family readiness services provided to Service 
members and their families shall be correlated to needs resulting 
from the unique challenges associated with military service across 
three domains of family readiness: 
 (1) Mobilization and deployment readiness. 
 (2) Mobility and financial readiness. 
 (3) Personal and family life readiness. 
 Promote military recruitment and retention, and support commanders’ 
ability to maintain a mission-ready force consistent with DODI 4001.1 
Installation Support. 
 Provide compassionate, coordinated assistance and support to DOD 
personnel and their families in the event of an all-hazards incident. (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2012) 
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c. DODI 4000.01 – Installation Support:  
 Provide acquisition, management, resourcing, and delivery of 
installation support to advance the overall mission of the 
Department of Defense. Installation support shall be governed to 
ensure DOD Components provide consistently high standards in 
support of the warfighting mission [emphasis added]. 
 Ensure that Installation Commanding Officers retain the authority 
to adjust standards to meet the morale, local quality of life, and 
work environment needs. This applies to family quality of life 
needs as well. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2008) 
d. UFC 4-711-01 Family Housing 
UFC 4-711-01’s Military Family Housing goal statement: “To provide quality-
housing neighborhoods and dwellings to contribute to a strong force of skilled people who 
provide the readiness of our Military Forces” (Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 1). 
UFC 4-711-01’s Military Family Housing objective ISO its goal statement: “To 
bring the existing required housing inventory up to contemporary housing standards (i.e., 
life safety, convenience, quality, livability, maintainability) to the extent practicable 
through repair, improvement and replacement” (Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 1). 
Next, regardless the current DOD policy desired end states and strategies just 
reviewed calling for delivery of high-quality products and services, the following 
undesirable results regarding housing and readiness concerns were provided or covered 
through GAO and DODIG reports, Congressional testimony, etc. These examples support 
the assertion that a mismatch exists, resulting in substandard products and services being 
received by service members and their families. 
This is not to say that all privatized housing projects are failing to meet established 
policies, standards, and expectations. The fact these events occurred brings to light the 
reality that mismatches exist; the occurrence of these events is otherwise unexplainable. 
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However, as discussed by the members of Congress, witness testimony, and explained in 
the GAO and DODIG reports, the problems seem to be systemic and pervasive. 
2. Congressional hearings and testimony 
a. House Committee on Appropriations Hearing on Military Privatized 
Housing; Tuesday, March 3, 2020 
Three panels of witnesses provided testimony to the committee on the condition of 
privatized military housing. The first panel consisted of two military housing tenants 
representing their families to give testimony and answer the committee’s inquiries related 
to the tenant’s privatized military housing experiences. In the second panel, representatives 
from five of the fourteen privatized military housing developers that provide housing 
through the MHPI were present to give testimony on behalf of Balfour Beatty 
Communities, Corvias, Lend Lease America, Hunt Military Communities, and Lincoln 
Military Housing. Lastly, in the third panel, Acting Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, 
Mr. Pete Potochney, and Ms. Elizabeth Field, Defense Capabilities and Management.  
In her opening remarks, Chairwoman Mrs. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz included 
mention of the 2018 Reuters’ articles included under the series title, “Ambushed at Home: 
The hazardous, squalid housing of American military families,” and stated she had the 
opportunity to visit and speak with many families affected by conditions similar to those 
included in the Reuters’ articles during her travels to military installations and personally, 
“…seen first-hand the deplorable conditions of some of the military housing and how long 
the conditions were allowed to persist without response from the private companies…” 
(House Appropriations Committee, 2020). 
United States Army Colonel Scott Gerber opened his testimony by stating he was 
shocked to learn of the next witnesses’ privatized military housing experiences, the 
Gherdovich’s, which paralleled his, yet followed a year after his and a year after the first 
hearing when the privatized housing providers swore under oath to fix these issues 
(presumably alluding to the February 13, 2019 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing 
to receive testimony on the condition of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative) 
(House Appropriations Committee, 2020). 
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Colonel Gerber’s testimony included many of his own family’s privatized military 
housing experiences: living in two mold infested homes, being unable to acquire acceptable 
maintenance work and misinformed by privatized housing employees who told him mold 
would not hurt him or his family, and the fact he was personally powerless and unable to 
stop the housing allowance allotment that continued to be drawn for uninhabitable housing. 
Experiences while attempting to help other families included finding water 
damaged and toxic levels of mold in 13 of 16 homes tested after hiring and independent 
inspector, which included six of seven homes the contractor recently built for junior 
enlisted service members and their families.  
Colonel Gerber’s testimony centered on two strategic imperatives that he felt must 
come to fruition if the DOD and Congress were to be successful in bringing an end to 
further ghastly military housing stories like the ones included in his testimony:  
1. Oversight; and,  
2. Accountability 
Colonel Gerber added these imperatives could be achieved through three initiatives: 
a. Full implementation of the 18 Tenant Bill of Rights. 
b. Expanding role of military families and advocacy groups in formal discussions.  
c. Government finding a way to bring in independent inspectors to ensure 
commanders receive unbiased assessments. 
Colonel Gerber closed his opening remarks by saying:  
I’ve deployed to combat three times. I’ve executed over 400 combat patrols. 
I carry a list of 42 friends and comrades we lost in combat, six of them under 
my command, so when I see what I saw in Fort Meade it’s personal. We 
cannot send people into harm’s way wondering if their family is in danger 
from the house, they live in. (Our experience with privatized housing, 2020) 
Mrs. Gherdovich’s testimony included experiences that paralleled Colonel 
Gerber’s but included more personal information regarding the negative health effects 
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caused by the toxic conditions that she and her family were exposed to during the time the 
family lived in privatized military housing, especially the effects on her six children.  
While the events Mrs. Gherdovich describes in her testimony are concerning, what 
is alarming and directly applicable to this study is the fact Mrs. Gherdovich states in her 
testimony that the residence provided to Mrs. Gherdovich and her family by the privatized 
housing developer had never actually been approved for occupancy (i.e., never received 
pre-leasing approval from the Base Commander). The Base Vice Commander, having 
learned of this new information after the fact, visited the Gherdovich family at the residence 
immediately after learning the home had never been approved for occupancy. 
Given the long-term leases, many of which 50 years or longer, to include legal 
stipulations contained in the MHPI project business agreements (Field, 2020a, p. 18), it 
appears oversight and accountability as Colonel Gerber recommended in his testimony are 
the most prudent and impactful assurances DODI 4165.63 housing policy requirements 
will be met (Our experience with privatized housing, 2020); however, it appears holding 
the private developers accountable has been somewhat elusive.  
Acting ASD(Sustainment), Mr. Peter Potochney, gave testimony in the third panel, 
his testimony centering on the actions necessary to correct recent MHPI failures and 
misgivings and that the recent designation of the Chief Housing Officer (CHO) will 
facilitate course correction through standardized policies, processes, and procedures while 
also ensuring appropriate oversight and administration of privatized housing (Statement of 
Mr. Peter J. Potochney, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment) on the 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative, 2020).  
Secretary Potochney provided a brief overview of MHPI, stating, “The Department 
remains confident that housing privatization was the right thing to do, and with continued 
diligence from all, can return to the success enjoyed over the first 20 years of the program” 
(Statement of Mr. Peter J. Potochney, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment) 
on the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, 2020, p. 1). 
Secretary Potochney next pointed out an important fact as it relates to the MHPI:  
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It is important to note that the private MHPI partners operating these 
projects are not DOD or Military Department contractors. The MHPI 
projects are private business entities and our relationship with them is not 
governed by federal acquisition regulations. The Military Departments 
retain oversight and limited decision-making rights through the project legal 
agreements. The government cannot unilaterally change a project legal 
document [Emphasis added]. When changes are pursued, in addition to 
project owner consent, the project lender also retains approval rights to 
project legal document changes. (Statement of Mr. Peter J. Potochney, 
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment) on the Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative, 2020, p. 2) 
Secretary Potochney included that each of the services monitor the MHPI projects 
under their charge to ensure private developer compliance with the terms of the project’s 
business agreements to include both legal and regulatory requirements, as applicable. Five 
key oversight area efforts were discussed, which Secretary Potochney believed would 
provide the requisite structure, engagement, and oversight to allow the DOD, its service 
members, and the service members’ families to once again enjoy the success of the MHPI 
as it did for the first 20 years of the program: 1) Senior leader engagement; 2) Rebuilding 
trust; 3) Accountability; 4) Transparency and communication, and 5) Financial viability 
(Statement of Mr. Peter J. Potochney, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment) 
on the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, 2020). 
Secretary Potochney’s testimony brings into focus some of the unique challenges 
associated with the MHPI and an under-performing MHPI project provider. For example, 
if the department and its services have little to no authority to direct and/or affect change 
for poor private developer performance, what is the benefit, the return on investment, of 
the increased oversight? Further, as has been discussed, all DOD policies place the 
responsibility and accountability for service member and military family housing, 
installation support, and QoL, etc., firmly upon the shoulders of the Installation 
Commanders; however, as Secretary Potochney’s testimony points out, not the service 
secretaries, or the assistant DOD secretaries, not even the SECDEF himself are vested with 
the authority over the MHPI project and/or private developers to affect any change in 
performance or behavior outside of some [comparatively and relatively speaking] small 
financial bonuses and incentives. Succinctly, as it relates to the “R-A-A” concepts, the 
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quagmire of figuring out how the DOD or the respective services enforce private developer 
compliance without the authority to direct change in private developer performance and 
behavior remains.  
Further, assuming the matters of Mrs. Gherdovich’s sworn testimony are in fact 
true and accurate, it appears even further vexing is the matter of enforcing compliance with 
other applicable legal and regulatory requirements, such as in the case of the private 
developer providing the Gherdovich’s with a residence that had never received clearance 
for occupancy (Written testimony, 2020). 
b. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing to receive testimony 
from the Government Accountability Office regarding reports of 
substandard conditions and services; Tuesday, December 3, 2019 
The near two and a half hour hearing can be summarized in the first few minutes of 
Committee Chairman, Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe’s opening remarks, referring to the 
condition of privatized military housing being, “…a national crisis of proportions we 
haven’t seen since the scandal at Walter Reed about a decade ago” (GAO on privatized 
housing, 2019). 
It is unclear if Chairman Inhofe comparing the likeliness of privatized military 
housing to the Walter Reed scandal was in reference to how individual incidents, by 
themselves, being seemingly trivial and not make sense, such as a private developer leasing 
a family of eight with a newborn infant child a home that never received pre-leasing 
approval from the base commander, or the byproducts of “resentment and 
disenfranchisement” that develops as a result the cumulative effects taking a toll on the 
well-being of those affected, as alluded to by Joe Wilson, a Walter Reed clinical social 
worker (Priest & Hull, 2007). 
Chairman Inhofe went on to say, “…members of this committee, our staff, and 
myself, we’ve all traveled and seen these problems first-hand. This is the third hearing this 
committee has had on this issue…progress has not been what we wanted. We continue to 
hear regularly from the families across the country about questionable practices and poor 
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workmanship and frankly in some places about housing contractors not caring about the 
families they are supposed to be serving” (GAO on privatized housing, 2019). 
Chairman Inhofe directed his comments to the service secretaries and service chiefs 
present to give testimony: “…the time for talk is over. If these companies can’t get the job 
done you owe it to the military families to find a company who will…this housing problem 
is really a readiness problem…I ask: What are we going to do about it since a year later, 
we’re still hearing about the same problems (GAO on privatized housing, 2019)? 
It should be noted that Chairman Inhofe caveated his comments to the service 
secretaries and service chiefs with the statement that, while his comments may seem 
critical, his comments are not personally directed at the witnesses themselves, but rather 
their predecessors (only one of the witness’ tenure had spanned the year the committee had 
been holding hearings regarding substandard military housing conditions and services). 
Ms. Elizabeth Field, GAO, included in her testimony that service members and 
their families began reaching out to the GAO in 2018 for help and to share their privatized 
military housing stories. Ms. Field stated GAO received reports of rampant mold issues, 
vermin infestation, as well as raw sewage, gas, and carbon monoxide leaks from privatized 
military housing tenants nation-wide. These reports were problematic for the GAO given 
recent DOD reports of maintaining an 87% military housing tenant satisfaction approval 
score, which Ms. Field pointed out, the DOD cited as, “…being a critical indicator of 
overall program success” (GAO on privatized housing, 2019). 
Ms. Field explained that the GAO conducted an analysis of the DOD survey in 
hopes of gaining an understanding and explanation for the disparity between reports the 
GAO received from privatized military housing tenants compared to the DOD’s privatized 
military housing program tenant satisfaction survey score. According to Ms. Field’s 
testimony, results of the GAO’s analysis showed that the 87% satisfaction score as reported 
by the DOD was both inaccurate and unreliable based on the manner the survey was 
conducted, and the survey questions being asked. Further, irregularities regarding how 
survey scores were compiled as well as how the scores were calculated also invalidated 
any plausibility of an 87% military housing tenant satisfaction score. 
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 These results left the GAO to question DOD reports claiming military housing’s 
high occupancy rate of 93% program-wide was an unequivocal indicator of, “…a high 
level of service member satisfaction and overall success in providing suitable and desirable 
housing” (GAO on privatized housing, 2019).  
To learn first-hand from privatized military housing tenants why they chose 
privatized military housing over other available options, GAO performed site visits, 
traveling to 10 different installations, and met with 15 different focus groups. As testified 
by Ms. Field, privatized military housing tenants overwhelmingly provided two primary 
explanations for choosing to occupy privatized military housing over other available 
options, neither of which were for reasons related to the base-housing unit itself other than 
the proximity of the residence’s physical location being on base. The first explanation was 
a high demand for expeditious access to base community services (e.g., childcare and 
medical care, especially in the case of Exceptional Family Members (EFM), and the second 
related to concerns that local community housing was either not safe, or not affordable 
(GAO on privatized housing, 2019). Based on the GAO’s evaluation and analysis it appears 
any claims made regarding privatized housing occupancy rates of greater than 93% being 
a result of service members’ satisfaction with their actual living accommodations is 
unfounded. 
To acquire a firmer grasp of the military housing problem and better understand the 
disparity in reporting, the GAO took a quantitative approach in hopes correlating work 
order rate and frequency with other associated work order characteristics would provide 
more definitive answers and guide further ongoing reviews and interpretation. GAO 
collected over 8,000,000 work order records generated through the 79 housing projects 
managed by the 14 private developer firms that support the MHPI. While the GAO’s 
review did not provide the insight or answers they were hoping for, other unexpected issues 
were identified that still proved to be useful and beneficial. The GAO learned that private 
companies’ maintenance and service records were riddled with inaccuracies, the most 
plausible explanation being because the maintenance data had not been consistently 
maintained. Unusual and unexplainable anomalies such as duplicate work orders and even 
work orders that had been closed on dates that predated the work order’s submission date 
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were also discovered. The fact that the GAO learned these unusual and unexplainable 
anomalies were the only consistent trend across all 14 private developers and their 79 
MHPI projects was an added and unintentional benefit that led to another lesson learned: 
If the GAO could not use this data because of its unreliability, the data should not have 
been relied on as the basis for paying out incentive bonuses to the privatized housing 
providers (GAO on privatized housing, 2019). 
In his testimony before the committee, Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. 
Modley cited the issues with the data the Navy was receiving from its MHPI project 
providers being a matter of the MHPI project providers providing the data in a meaningful 
way to ensure the data was accurate and relative related to providing a measurement and 
indicator of what the data was supposed to measure or was intended to measure. In short, 
Acting Secretary Modley explained to the committee that the data the Navy received from 
the MHPI project was not specific to the individual housing unit itself nor was the data 
standardized. These factors alone warrant concern of the accuracy of the MHPI project 
provider-provided data; compound these issues with the many others exponentially 
compounds the inaccuracy of the data received from the MHPI project providers (GAO on 
privatized housing, 2019). 
In their own testimony that followed shortly after Acting Secretary of the Navy 
Modley’s, both newly appointed, Secretary of the Air Force Barbara M. Barrett, and 
Secretary of the Army Ryan D. McCarthy both acknowledged and confirmed having 
similar issues and concerns with the data their respective service was receiving from its 
MHPI project providers and further added that receiving the data in aggregate as opposed 
to unaggregated was a significant contributing factor for why the data from the MHPI 
project providers was not accurate or a reliable means of measuring or confirming 
achievement of MHPI project objectives. One example provided by Secretary of the Air 
Force Barrett was that the data in aggregate obscured the individual itemized issues, adding 
that many of these individual issues that were examples of the critical points of failure and 
substandard performance being provided by the MHPI project providers, and consequently 
why some of the housing issues had continued to go on unnoticed (GAO on privatized 
housing, 2019). 
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c. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing to receive testimony 
on chain of command’s accountability to provide safe military housing 
and other building infrastructure to servicemembers and their families; 
Thursday, March 7, 2019 
The committee’s second hearing on privatized military housing. The focus of this 
hearing was to receive testimony from the secretaries of the military services and their 
Chiefs of Staff (CoS). Also included was the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). This hearing’s testimony was similar to the 
December 2019 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in that the members of the 
committee shared what they had personally seen at the military installations they had 
visited. The stories followed suit with the examples provided by House Committee on 
Appropriations Chair, The Honorable Mrs. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, during the March 
3, 2020, Committee on Appropriations hearing, as well as Senate Committee on Armed 
Services Chair, The Honorable Mr. James Inhofe’s opening remarks during the December 
3, 2019, committee hearing (Chain of command’s accountability, 2019). 
d. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing to receive testimony 
on the current condition of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative 
(MHPI); Wednesday, February 13, 2019 
This was the first of many hearings the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services 
would hold to receive testimony on the MHPI. This hearing consisted of two primary 
witness panels, the first multiple spouses of military members, who each testified to ensure 
Congress and the military service’s leadership learned of their privatized military housing 
experiences. The second panel of witnesses consisted of the owners or senior members of 
the private developers that owned the MHPI project (Hearing to receive testimony, 2019). 
e. Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) 
(1) Department of Defense Inspector General Report DODIG-2019-056 
The 2019 accounting and financial reporting audit of the MHPI resulted in two 
principal findings stemming from multiple accounting errors ranging from a low of $1.8 
million to a high of $4.2 billion (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2019). 
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(2) 2015 DODIG 2017–004 Summary Report 
The report summarizes half a dozen DODIG inspections that took place between 
2013 and 2016 that resulted in thousands of findings covered in depth in individual DODIG 
reports and inspections that span many years, showing a trend of housing, health, and 
habitability, and safety issues and concerns that go back to the early 2000s. Examples of 
summarized safety findings include 3,783 environmental, electrical, and fire protection 
system safety and health issues, as well as military housing findings at three separate 
military installations, one Navy, one Army, and one Air Force. These examples further 
illustrate the policy-strategy mismatches this study cites (Department of Defense Office of 
Inspector General, 2016). 
f. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
GAO reports on the MHPI over the last decade demonstrate the DOD succeeded in 
achieving its goal of privatizing 99% of its MFH (Lepore, 2018, p. 1). Unfortunately, these 
same GAO reports show the MHPI is beleaguered with various data and reporting 
discrepancies, financial challenges, and fraud-prone business practices and processes. 
These GAO reports are concerning given that an underperforming MHPI project can 
detract from service member or military family health and wellbeing, or worse, degrade a 
supporting unit’s ability to provide critical instillation services or logistics, resulting in 
negatively impacting installation mission success, ultimately degrading overall military 
readiness. Further, 2019 and 2020 GAO reports to include U.S. Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearings and testimonies demonstrate various accounts in which many of the 
private developers failed to meet the minimum performance requirements, yet many if not 
most of the private developers still received an incentive and/or performance award that 
was not earned and should have been denied based on health, life, safety or other form of 
violation (Field, 2020a, p. 7). 
The matter of private landlords still receiving bonuses and incentive fees comes 
under scrutiny following these reports of substandard performance when the purpose, or 
strategy, behind offering the bonuses and incentives is to entice and incentivize private 
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developers and landlords to maintain military housing units in good or above-average 
maintenance and repair.  
(1) Government Accountability Office Report GAO-18-218 
GAO made eight corrective action recommendations, most of which related to 
financial accounting discrepancies and inconsistencies that the GAO noted were consistent 
across the services. GAO also addressed the DOD’s failure to provide timely, comparable 
reports to Congress as required by public law (Lepore, 2018, p. 52,53). 
The fact these events occurred brings the reality and existence of the mismatch to 
light. The occurrence of these events is otherwise unexplainable. 
Substandard MHPI project provider performance and the associated undesirable 
results add increased risk to the force and mission, which prudently must be assumed until 
confirmation that the policy-strategy mismatches are resolved or effectively mitigated 
proves otherwise.  
Ergo, the need and motivation for this service member and military family housing, 
health, and readiness research study and its included survey instrument. Results from 
MFAN’s 2019 nationwide housing survey encompasses some 41,422 complaints made by 
privatized military housing tenants, over 6,600 of which being related to health concerns, 




A. RESEARCH METHOD 
A survey was conducted using United States Navy (USN) commands using a 
sample size representative to gather data on current housing characteristics and any 
potentially related occupant health matters. 
The study’s survey will be used to gather data related to respondent demographics, 
current housing characteristics, and evaluate respondent health, readiness, and well-being. 
The survey is structured to provide objective, policy-based feedback to gain insight 
regarding housing characteristics commonly suspected to cause, or known to cause, 
adverse occupant health related issues. With the purpose of military housing being to 
support the warfighter in support of National Defense, feedback, and analysis of that 
feedback that centers on gauging measurements of success of these desired end states 
provides value. 
B. SURVEY 
1. Survey Objective 
The objective of the survey is to acquire the necessary data to establish the 
characteristics of housing occupied by Active Duty Service Members (ADSM) and their 
families as well as any affects the housing has had on occupant health, well-being, and 
readiness. 
This data, in theory, will answer the research question:  
Have housing and family readiness program policy-strategy-mismatches impacted 
the health, well-being, and readiness of service members and their families?  
The research hypothesizes that the study and analysis will result in the identification 
of statistically significant findings that correlate to impacts to DOD readiness. Participation 
in the study and completion of the survey is both completely anonymous and voluntary. 
Data collection does not include acquiring personally identifiable information (PII) or 
protected health information (PHI). Measurement is a Likert scale for questions addressing 
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the research question and includes demographic data collection as a control. Respondents 
are informed of survey parameters via the recruitment email distributed in conducting the 
survey. Analysis will be done through a correlation/regression method. 
2. Survey Sample 
USN ADSMs assigned within the continental United States (CONUS) served as 
the survey population. June 2020 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) reflected a 
population size of 299,548 (P=299,548) (Department of Defense, 2020). The ideal sample 
size to acquire a 95% confidence interval (CI) with a 5% margin of error (MOE) equaled 
383 (N=383). Military housing survey response rates historically average between 
approximately 20% to 30% (CEL & Associates, 2020b, p. 3), (CEL & Associates, 2020a, 
p. 2) therefore, to account for the survey response rate, the survey distribution plan included 
distributing the survey to approximately 1,300 USN ADSMs to acquire the ideal sample 
size (N= 383) of 383 respondents. 
3. Survey Administration 
Primary and alternate CONUS based USN commands were randomly identified to 
serve as survey sponsoring commands, beginning with the USN command’s location 
related to the four U.S. Census Bureau regions, subdivided into nine divisions (US Census 
Bureau Regions and Divisions, 2015): 
         - Division 1: New England    - Division 6: East South Central 
         - Division 2: Middle Atlantic   - Division 7: West South Central 
         - Division 3: East North Central  - Division 8: Mountain 
         - Division 4: West North Central  - Division 9: Pacific 
         - Division 5: South Atlantic 
 
This equates to a total of 18 USN survey sponsoring commands; nine primaries, 
nine alternates. Any division(s) or region(s) not represented with survey results or survey 
responses that are not received will be addressed in Chapter IV – Analysis.  
Researchers will coordinate with command personnel to acquire command support 
to sponsor the survey. Each survey sponsoring command will provide a randomly 
generated list of 150 ADSM names and associated government email address to support 
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survey recruitment and survey distribution. Assuming a best-case scenario, 30% response 
rate provides approximately 50 completed surveys from each of the nine survey sponsoring 
commands, total (N=450) completed surveys and achievement of the ideal sample 
population (p=383). Survey management, distribution, and recruitment will be maintained 
by the researchers for quality assurance and to ensure compliance with research protocols. 
Survey sponsoring command leadership (e.g., Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, 
Command Master Chief) will not be involved in survey recruitment or conducting the 
survey in any way to ensure mitigation of any leadership influence.  
Bias influences are effectively mitigated by ensuring subjects understand that 
participation is voluntary and anonymous by reinforcing these facts in the recruitment 
script and survey link. Bias is mitigated given the plan/intent to have the recruitment script 
and survey link sent via email by an individual or office disassociated from Command 
Leadership roles and responsibilities. Primary data is obtained from surveys completed by 
random samplings of ADSMs assigned to the respective survey sponsoring USN 
command. Various USN commands located at or near military installations within CONUS 
and respective Census Bureau Region and Division geography will serve as a 
representative sampling of the population.  
4. Recruitment 
To participate in the survey, a subject must first “click” on a link included in the 
recruitment email. Only by clicking the link included in the recruitment email can the 
subject access the survey’s landing page which serves both as a final introduction, 
voluntary participation verification, and lastly, survey quota control. 
To proceed beyond the survey landing page and final introduction to participate in 
the survey, subjects are informed that ADSMs are the intended audience, and that survey 
participation is completely voluntary and anonymous. Per the NPS IRB approved exempt 
research proposal, subjects are informed that neither PII nor PHI is collected through 
participation in the survey. Subjects are reminded that the survey consists of 25 generalized 
questions regarding the characteristics of their current housing and any perceived affects 
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the housing has had on health, well-being, and readiness. Survey instrument (in the 
appendix) questions are grouped into four separate sections:  
(1) Section 1: Demographics, general, non-specific background information;  
(2) Section 2: Non-specific current duty assignment and housing background 
information;  
(3) Sections 3: Evaluation and rating of COVID-19 impacts;  
(4) Section 4: Evaluation and rating of current housing, health, and readiness. 
Subjects are provided instructions to click on the option they agree with the most 
to record their responses and to click in the space provided for numerical responses (Age, 
Pay Grade, Zip Code, etc.) and enter the appropriate one, two, or five-digit number. 
Subjects are also advised that completed survey responses will be summarized, evaluated, 
and analyzed in support of this study and could be used to support future studies. 
Subjects are informed that only responses from voluntary participants will be 
recorded. This marks the transition to the voluntary participation control and verification 
portion of the survey introduction. Subjects are advised to stop at this point in the survey 
introduction if their participation in the survey was forced or a result of undue influence in 
any way and that Researcher contact info was available at the bottom of the introduction 
should the subject have any questions. Subjects are given step by step procedures to follow 
to demonstrate they are taking the survey voluntarily as well as what to expect after the 
subject demonstrates taking the survey voluntarily: “By selecting the “Yes” option versus 
the “No” option, at the end of the introduction, and then clicking the “Next” button, these 
steps marked the end of the Introduction, and launched the survey.”  
Quota control question option was utilized to ensure no more than 50 completed 
survey responses were recorded for any one survey sponsoring command. 
Each command surveyed received its own individual serialized copy of the survey, 
each with a quota control set to 50 completed survey responses. The quota control question 
option provided subjects with two options: Option (1): “YES,” to take the survey, or Option 
(2): “No,” to not take the survey. If a subject selected “No,” the subject was not allowed to 
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take the survey. Selection of the “No” option took subjects to a survey exit page where the 
subject’s survey experience ended but provided a salutation message informing the subject 
that the survey would remain open for a brief period and encouraged to return to complete 
the survey. Subjects that selected “YES” were immediately enrolled and could begin taking 
the survey once the page refreshed with Section 1 of the survey loaded. 
a. Survey Design—Section 1. Demographics and current Leave and 
Earnings Statement (LES) information 
Section 1’s purpose is to gather general background data about the subject that 
could be beneficial in analyzing and comparing the data from the survey.  
Starting with Question #1, acquiring the subject’s age is relevant for correlation to 
mean behavior and societal data points: education, employment, annual income, shopping 
characteristics, etc. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021).  
Branch of military service allows USN commands to represent subjects from other 
branches of the military services assigned within their commands. This cross-service 
assignment reflects the DOD’s joint warfighter ethos. Additionally, this format sets the 
foundation for a DOD-wide housing, health, and readiness survey.  
Collecting current Pay Grade information allows for the data to be analyzed across 
the spectrum of military ranks between enlisted, officer and warrant officer communities. 
Length of military service, Question #4, provides for a variety of relevant 
demographic data points. Retention, for example, is always a focus in any military study 
given the costs avoided with high personnel turnover and improved corporate knowledge 
with increased retention. Enlisted pay grades historically encompass approximately 80% 
of the DOD’s manning regardless of overall end-strength (Department of Defense, 2020).  
Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) Type (With or Without Dependents) provides 
data for correlation regarding typical family-related survey responses and choices made by 
service members. For the purposes of this study this data specifically helps identify whether 
the subject should be residing in Unaccompanied Housing (UH). This is more likely the 
case of a junior service member that is not married who also does not have any qualifying 
dependents. Conversely, those service members qualifying for and residing in Military 
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Family Housing (MFH) given the service member has a spouse (one dependent), and/or 
two dependent children (three dependents or two dependents total, relatively). BAQ Type 
data is one of a variety of factors used in determining the type of MFH a service member 
qualifies for (e.g., two, three, or four bedroom-housing unit based on the number of 
dependents) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, 2020, 
p. 7). The five-digit Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) Zip Code helps determine the 
BAH rate the service member qualifies for based on duty station location the member is 
assigned. While there are options available to elect to receive BAH based on the location 
of dependents if other than with the member, this study assumes dependents are assigned 
with the service member at the member’s assigned duty location unless otherwise stated in 
the respondent’s survey response. Additionally, throughout the United States, there are 
high-cost and critical housing markets which dramatically change housing factors and 
dynamics, which are tracked by duty station Zip Code.  
While the factors and algorithms that go into the Housing Research Market 
Analysis (HRMA) are not the focus of this study, the HRMA is one of the principal 
determinants used to determine BAH amounts for the various duty station locations (by 
Zip Code). Availability of adequate local community housing is taken into account and is 
a factor in the HRMA rubric. Therefore, any study that evaluates and/or analyzes the 
adequacy of housing and housing allowances cannot turn a blind eye to the HRMA and the 
critical role the HRMA plays in determining the overall housing picture for a specified 
duty location. 
b. Survey Design—Section 2. Current assignment and housing 
background information 
Section 2 consists of six questions that are designed to acquire respondent 
background data pertaining to their current duty assignment, previous home ownership, 
and current housing information. This data, in conjunction with Section 1 data, builds the 
respondent profile.  
The respondent profile will inform the research and assist in identification of 
potential behavior patterns. Beginning with Question #7, the tour length of the respondent’s 
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current assignment is an important determinant whether the service member purchases or 
rents housing. It is generally accepted that service members assigned to a shore-duty tour 
for three years or longer are more likely to purchase a home than service members assigned 
to shore-duty for less than three years.  
Subjects that respond “Yes” to Question #8 confirming they have previously 
purchased a home may be more likely to have additional insight and understanding of 
building assemblages, construction, and home maintenance given the inherent need to 
evaluate these matters when considering purchasing a home. Increased requirements and 
responsibilities related to self-performed maintenance and repairs are also typically 
inherently associated with home ownership. Analysis of results may provide information 
to support whether previous home ownership biases respondent survey responses 
positively or negatively. 
Subjects describe their current residence in Question #9 to evaluate correlation to 
the subject’s responses to survey questions in Sections 3 and 4.  
Questions #10 and #11 ask the subject to identify characteristics specific to the type 
of housing the respondent currently occupies. Single family homes leased from a property 
owner or landlord may have a home warranty that covers appliances but is less likely to 
have or provide on-site or on-staff maintenance and repair personnel for performing routine 
preventive maintenance and unscheduled corrective maintenance. Lessees of single-family 
homes are often expected, or contractually obligated per the lease agreement, to perform 
basic non-invasive and non-corrective routine preventive maintenance (i.e., changing the 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) filters, or fixing a leaking toilet or 
faucet). Conversely, apartments, townhomes, and condominiums will normally have on-
site or on-staff maintenance and repair personnel for performing routine preventive 
maintenance as well as unscheduled corrective maintenance.  
Residents of barracks, UH, and MFH are asked to specify whether their military 
provided living quarters are government owned/managed or private developer owned/
managed. “Unsure” and “Other/Not Applicable” options are provided also in the event the 
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subject does not know or in the unlikely event there is a tertiary entity that own/manages 
the military provided living quarters. 
Reports from GAO, MFAN, as well as statements made during congressional 
testimony reflect that residents living in military provided quarters were frequently either 
unsure or confused regarding whether their military provided quarters were government 
owned/managed or private developer owned/managed. Additionally, these same reports 
and statements also reflected that many residents living in military provided quarters that 
were private developer owned/managed were unaware that there were government housing 
representatives available that serve as advocates for military residents that occupy private 
developer owned/managed military housing. Questions #9 through #12 will provide data 
to add insight to this issue and the extent of it being a more pervasive problematic matter 
or merely just a coincidental occurrence of isolated incidents.  
Question 12 is one of responsibility, accountability, and authority. All installation 
housing programs are managed by one of the four services. In most cases, it is the service 
having installation responsibility that retains the authority and accountability for housing 
and family readiness support programs and services. Acquiring survey respondent 
feedback from service members from the same area is valuable given it provides an 
opportunity to determine rate and magnitude of selection dispersion among the services 
(i.e., if one service’s personnel is more likely to choose “Unsure” or select “Other” than 
the other services’ personnel). As it relates to acquiring accurate data to measure and gauge 
the quality and performance of military provided housing, the “Unsure” responses are of 
special interest regarding survey respondents that have acknowledged residing in MFH. 
c. Survey Design—Section 3. Rating and evaluation, effects of COVID-19 
Four questions are included for COVID-19 control to account for the exogenous 
shock of COVID-19, and how COVID-19 may have affected respondent well-being, job 
performance, health, and readiness. This data can be cross-referenced with Section 4 rating 
and evaluations to gauge and differentiate COVID-19 impacts to well-being, job 
performance, health, and readiness from residence-caused or related impacts.  
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d. Survey Design—Section 4. Rating and evaluation, housing, health, and 
readiness 
Section 4 questions center on three principal themes: 
1. Department policy-based questions that obtain objective feedback 
from the joint force whether policy desired end states are being 
met or not.  
2. Policy-based questions that return clear objective responses that 
identifies potential health and readiness related issues to facilitate 
proactive versus reactive engagement and resolution. 
3. The results of one and two above should provide improved, 
measurable feedback that leads to an improved and measurable 
understanding of a survey respondent’s health, well-being, and 
readiness. 
Section 4 survey analysis information was derived from key DOD policies, 
directives, manuals, and mandates. Most if not all were included and listed as references in 
DODI 4165.63 DOD Housing Instruction and DODM-4165.63 DOD Housing 
Management Manual.  
The DOD instruction, directive, manual, policy, mandate, etc., used for the survey 
questions were extracted from: 
e. DODI 4165.63 - DOD Housing and DODM 4165.63 – DOD Housing 
Management Manual 
Survey Questions #17, #18, and #19 provide survey respondent feedback regarding 
long-standing policy objective requirements stipulating that eligible personnel have 
adequate access to affordable, quality housing facilities and services that are both safe as 
well as consistent with the service member’s grade and dependent status (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010a). While 
ADSMs and MFH are the focus of this study, it is important to note that MFH is occupied 
by far more than just ADSMs and their eligible beneficiaries. Based on the MHPI’s 
project’s tenant waterfall policy and occupancy rates, the ratio between ADSMs, federal 
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service employees, retired military, contracted employees (even the private real estate 
developer’s own employees), and the general public (Gorman, 2016). Additionally, DOD 
Housing policies state that military housing units should be comparable in size (i.e., square 
footage of inside of residence), [build] quality, construction materials, etc., as those found 
in local community [private sector] housing (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010a), (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010b). 
f. DODI 1342.22 – Military Family Readiness 
Question #20 is an incorporation of critical military family readiness programs and 
services, many of which are hallmark support programs that are vital to military 
recruitment and retention (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2012). 
g. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-711-01 – Family Housing 
UFC 4–117-01 is the DOD’s principal residential building design and planning 
reference resource. Unfortunately, it does not necessarily address post-construction 
habitability issues. Regarding Question #21, countless state and federal agencies 
acknowledge and assert that the best mold, mildew, and/or moisture detection device is 
your nose; your ability to smell. Federal agency guidance advises housing tenants and 
building occupants to be well-aware to take caution and be critical of any housing unit or 
building that possesses a musty odor, an empirical indicator of excess moisture, or worse, 
environmental contaminants such as mildew and mold (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2021). In Questions #22 and #23, we acknowledge that some CONUS 
locations do not have central heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) or AC 
(Department of Defense, 2018b). 
The National Center for Healthy Housing (NCHH) provides a basic maintenance 
checklist to help maintain a healthy home. The checklist recommends periodical or season-
specific preventive maintenance checks, even those as simple as seasonal, quarterly, or 
more frequent heating and ventilation air filter changes at a minimum (based on individual 
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needs and circumstances, such as having pets, environmental and medical conditions, etc.) 
(Brennan & Tohn, n.d.).  
More closely related to this study’s survey, Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) guidance recommends checking your HVAC filters every month, especially during 
the summer and winter months when a home’s HVAC system is operating more frequently 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2014a). Generally, the HVAC’s filtration system is 
only filtering the air while the unit is operating (i.e., cooling, or heating). Many factors can 
alter and affect the amount of dust, dirt, debris, etc., retained by the system’s filters.  
By inspecting your HVAC filters monthly you can potentially avoid making your 
HVAC system work harder than necessary; if the filter looks dirty, even if after only a 
month, the EPA recommends changing it. Both you and your HVAC system will breathe 
easier. At a minimum, the EPA recommends changing your HVAC filters every three 
months given dirty filters reduce the system’s efficiency making the system work harder, 
not only wasting energy but also contributing to climate change (Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2014b). 
There is little to no inference involved on the part of the survey respondent or the 
researcher when evaluating survey respondent responses when asked a question such as 
Question#23. The answer is simply “Yes,” or “No’. Suffice to say, if a Likert scale interval 
variable was used in place of a nominal [binary] variable, any survey respondent that 
responds, “Strongly Disagree,” or arguably even, “Somewhat Disagree,” with survey 
Question #24 would likely be a clear indicator of health, life, or safety issues until proven 
otherwise given building assemblage characteristics that reflect a “Strongly disagree” 
response are indicative of a much larger problem such as leaking plumbing drains, leaking 
water supply lines, areas of excess condensation, etc., indicating underlying insulation or 
other environmental control issues. Ergo one of the additional benefits of this study’s 
survey format over previous DOD housing survey formats is that it does provide feedback 
regarding the characteristics of the service member’s living environment, specifically 
conditions and characteristics that are commonly associated with health, life, or safety 
issues, whereas the DOD’s previous and current survey formats do not. 
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h. DODI 4000.01 - Installation Support 
Questions #25 through #29 support a specific task, duty, responsibility, or a 
combination thereof. DODI 4000.01’s purpose, definition, and policy statements serve as 
overarching installation-level program support and services desired end states: 
Purpose: Prescribes installation management policy to enhance DOD use of 
assets to effectively support the warfighter. (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2008) 
Definitions: Installation Support. Any of the five categories of services and 
support activities the DOD engages in life-cycle management of 
installations: (1) Facilities; (2) Services; (3) Family Housing; (4) 
Environment; and (5) Base Realignment & Closure. Program element 
definitions for facilities, environment, and other installation support 
functions are maintained by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Environment) and Director, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE). (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2008) 
Policy. It is DOD policy to:  
A. Support and promote Common Delivery of Installation Support 
(CDIS). 
B. Provide acquisition, management, resourcing, and delivery of 
installation support to advance the overall DOD mission. Installation 
support shall be governed to ensure consistently high standards in 
support of the warfighting mission. 
C. Promote cost transparency and more consistent Programming and 
Budgeting decisions by aligning the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution (PPB&E) process with Common Output 
Level Standards (COLS). (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2008) 
i. 2018 National Defense Strategy 
Any effects that reduce military recruitment and retention are clearly prejudicial to 
the DOD’s current NDS (White House, 2018). 
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IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. RELATIONSHIPS 
Table 1 lists the concepts and/or policy end state requirements covered as specified 
by the source as it relates to the survey instrument questions. The emphasis and focus being 
on service member and military family health, readiness, and well-being. 
Table 1. Relationship: Concepts, policy and reference sources, and survey 
questions 
Concept Source Survey 
Improving and maintaining the readiness 
of service members and military families; 
including financial readiness 




Principal DOD housing directive; 
reliance on private sector housing 
DoDI 4165.63 - DOD 
Housing 
Q9 
Ensuring eligible personnel (e.g., service 
members, beneficiaries, dependents, etc.) 
have sufficient access to affordable, 
quality housing that is consistent with the 
service member’s rank/grade, dependent 
status, and similar to local community 




Q3, Q5, Q6, 
Q9, Q10 
DOD’s principal residential building 
planning, design and construction 
resource tool comprised of Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. Also covers sustainment 
needs, and criteria for successful 
restoration and modernization 
Unified Facility 
Criteria (UFC) 4-711-
01 - Family Housing 
Q3, Q5, Q6, 
Q9, Q18 
Benchmarks local community [private 
sector] housing construction and 
maintenance markets to establish DOD 
standards that improve readiness through 
enhanced QoL and increased military 
recruitment and retention 
National Association 

















Concept Source Survey 
Acquisition, management, and disposal 
of DOD property 
DoDD 4165.06, Real 
Property 
Q18, Q21-24 
Service, supply, procurement, and 
management of military construction and 
military family housing 
Title 10 U.S. Code, 










B. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION AND SAMPLE 
Table 2 reflects the response data by U.S. Census Bureau region and division. 
Survey administration and data acquisition was conducted IAW the study’s research 
protocols. Surveys were made available over the December 21, 2020 to February 17, 2021 
time-period. All commands surveyed were USN commands and were provided 14-day 
survey time periods. The only exceptions made were commands surveyed during the 2020 
Christmas and New Year time periods, which were afforded 21 days to account for seasonal 
holidays. Only one command fit this description. Additionally, any command that was 
surveyed during the time-period a federal or national holiday was observed had its survey 
time-period extended based on observance of the federal holiday per Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) holiday observance guidance.  
Thirty-three contacts by email or phone were made in conducting the survey. USN 
commands or contacts were made in all four U.S. Census Bureau regions and nine 
divisions; however, it was not possible to acquire data in all identified areas. Circumstances 
for not being able to acquire data include USN commands within the region/division not 
possessing adequate billets authorized (BA) and/or on board (OB) end strength to support 
and/or produce a randomly generated list of 150 ADSMs IAW the study’s research 
protocols.  
COVID-19 factors also negatively impacted survey administration. Many 
commands conveyed concerns of low survey support which would presumably result in 
lower than expected survey responses due to teleworking requirements. Survey 
administration unfortunately coincidentally occurred in unison with the DOD’s full-scale, 
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DOD-wide COVID-19 inoculation effort, which obviously took priority. Further, towards 
the latter half of the survey period, the areas located in the northern regions and divisions 
experienced unusual and inordinate amounts of snowfall that resulted in “snow days.” 
Personnel were not required to report to work for safety and travel concerns for days at a 
time (phone musters and the like provided accountability at the command level but 
hindered survey subject access to their DOD workstations). Given surveys were distributed 
to service member’s official DOD email address, service members not being unable to 
access their DOD workstations negatively impacted survey response rates to some effect. 
Table 2. Survey administration and sample 
Region Division State N n Rate 
West Pacific  California 150 40 26.7% 
West Mountain Nevada 150 11 7.3% 
South West South Central Oklahoma 150 5 3.3% 
South South Atlantic Maryland 150 3 2.0% 
South East South Central  Mississippi 150 1 0.7% 
Midwest East North Central Illinois 150 4 2.7% 
 
C. DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Data and variable descriptions are listed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Table 4 
includes identification of the principal variable type (e.g., Categorical, Interval, etc.). 
Table 3. Data description 
Section Question Description 
S1 Q1 
Age (in years); (#=two-digit numerical value; 0=Prefer not to 
answer) 
S1 Q2 
Branch of Military Service (1=USA; 2=USMC; 3=USN; 
4=USAF) 
S1 Q3(a)-(c)  Current Pay Grade (as applicable): 
S2 Q3(a) Enlisted (1=E1; 2=E2; 3=E3; 4=E4; etc.) 
S1 Q3(b) Officer (1=O1; 2=O2; 3=O3; 4=O4; etc.) 
S1 Q3(c) Officer - Prior Enlisted (1=O1E; 2=O2E; 3=O3E; etc.) 
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Section Question Description 
S1 Q4 Length of Military Service (in Months) 
S1 Q5(a) BAQ Type (1=With Dependents; 0=Without Dependents) 
S1 Q5(b) BAQ Type With Dependents; (# of Dependents) 
S1 Q6 VHA Zip 
S2 Q7 Tour length of current duty assignment (in Months) 
S2 Q8 Previously purchased home or residence; (1=Yes; 0=No) 
S2 Q9 
Current residence (1=Residence located within the local civilian 




Current residence within the local civilian community (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
S2 Q10(a)  Residence is “Rented”; (1=Yes; 0=No) 
S2 Q10(b) Residence is “Owned”; (1=Yes; 0=No) 
S2 Q10(c) Residence is a Single-Family Home; (1=Yes; 0=No) 
S2 Q10(d) Residence is an Apartment; (1=Yes; 0=No) 
S2 Q10(e) Residence is a Condominium/Townhouse; (1=Yes; 0=No) 
S2 Q10(f) Resides in Barracks, UH, or MFH, otherwise=0 
S2 Q10(g) Resides in other; (1=Yes; No=0) 
S2 Q11 
Residence is Barracks, UH, or MFH; Owning/Managing entity 
is; (1=Gov’t Owned/Managed; 2=PPV; 3=Unsure; 4=Other) 
S2 Q12 
Housing and readiness programs where assigned are provided 
by; (1=USA; 2=USMC; 3=USN; 4=USAF; 5=Unsure; 6=None; 
7=Other) 
S3 Q13 
COVID-19 affects: well-being; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
S3 Q14 
COVID-19 affects: job performance; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
S3 Q15 
COVID-19 affects: health; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
S3 Q16 
COVID-19 affects: readiness; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
S4 Q17 
BAH provides access to quality local area housing; (Strongly 
disagree=1; Strongly agree=5) 
S4 Q18 
Price points being similar, compare local civilian community 
housing standards and quality, to military housing standards and 
quality; (Local community significantly better=1; Military 
significantly better=5) 
S4 Q19 
Local area provides adequate access to safe, healthy, affordable 
housing; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5) 
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Section Question Description 
S4 Q20 
New arrivals receive relocation assistance information well in 
advance of arrival; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5) 
S4 Q21 
Residence has a strange odor, smells funny; (Strongly agree=1; 
Strongly disagree=5) 
S4 Q22 
HVAC receives regularly scheduled maintenance; (Strongly 
disagree=1; Strongly agree=5) 
S4 Q23 
All HVAC air filters replaced every three months or sooner; 
(Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5) 
S4 Q24 
Ceilings, walls, floors not leaking, not discolored or stained, 
paint is not peeling; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5) 
S4 Q25 
Affect residence has on well-being; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
S4 Q26 
Affect residence has on job performance; (Significantly 
reduces=1; Significantly increases=5) 
S4 Q27 
Affect residence has on health; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
S4 Q28 
Affect residence has on readiness; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5)  
S4 Q29 
Current housing/readiness program impacts on unit’s mission; 
(Significant negative impact=1; Significant favorable impact=5) 
S4 Q30 
Housing and readiness programs’ current affect on military 
recruitment and retention; (Significantly reduces=1; 
Significantly increases=5) 
 
Table 4. Variable description 
Section Variable Description 
S1 Age (in years) 
Q1; ([##]=two-digit numerical value; 0=Prefer 
not to answer); Interval variable 
S1 Branch of Military Service 
Q2; (1=USA; 2=USMC; 3=USN; 4=USAF); 
Categorical variable 
S1 
Pay Grade: Enlisted (E1-
E9) 
Q3(a); (1=E1; 2=E2; 3=E3; 4=E4; etc.); 
Categorical variable 
S1 
Pay Grade: Officer (O1-
O10) 
Q3(b); (1=O1; 2=O2; 3=O3; 4=O4; etc.); 
Categorical variable 
S1 
Pay Grade: Officer - Prior 
Enlisted 
Q3(c); (1=O1E; 2=O2E; 3=O3E; etc.); 
Categorical variable 
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Section Variable Description 
S1 Length of Military Service  
Q4; ([Totaled in Months], Years + Months); 
Interval variable 
S1 BAQ Type  
Q5(a); [(per LES], 1=With Dependents; 
0=Without Dependents); Nominal [binary] 
variable 
S1 # of Dependents Q5(b); ([##] per LES); Interval variable 
S1 VHA Zip 
Q6; ([per LES] “Max” demonstrates Zip 
dispersion; 0=Prefer not to answer); Categorical 
variable 
S2 
Duty assignment tour 
length 
Q7; ([Totaled in Months], Years + Months); 
Interval variable 
S2 
Previous home or 
residence purchase 
Q8; (1=Yes); Q10b (1=Yes); Nominal [binary] 
variable 
S2 Current residence type  
Q9; (1=Residence located within the local 
civilian community; 2=Barracks/UH; 3=MFH; 
4=Other [Explanation requested]); Categorical 
variable 
S2 
Current residence is 
located within local 
civilian community 
housing 
Q10(a)-Q10(f); ([1=Yes/Applicable, selects all 
that apply, Q10(a), Q10(b), Q10(c), Q10(d), 
Q10(e), otherwise=0]; Q10(f), Q10(g)=0); 
Nominal [binary] variables 
S2 Residence is “Rented” 
Q10(a)=1 ([Yes/Applicable]; Q10(b)=0, selects 
applicable residence type, Q10(c), Q10(d), 
Q10(e)]; Q10(f), Q10(g)=0); Nominal [binary] 
variables 
S2 Residence is “Owned” 
Q10(b)=1 ([Yes/Applicable); Q10(a)=0, selects 
applicable residence type, Q10(c), Q10(d), 
Q10(e)]; Q10(f), Q10(g)=0); Nominal [binary] 
variables 
S2 
Residence is a Single 
Family Home 
Q10(c)=1 ([Yes/Applicable]; [Q10(a), 
Q10(b)]=1 as applicable); ([Q10(d), Q10(e), 
Q10(f), Q10(g)]=0); Nominal [binary] variables 
S2 Residence is an Apartment 
Q10(d)=1 ([Yes/Applicable]; [Q10(a), 
Q10(b)]=1 as applicable); ([Q10(c), Q10(e), 
Q10(f), Q10(g)]=0); Nominal [binary] variables 
S2 
Residence is a 
Condominium, or 
Townhouse 
Q10(e)=1 ([Yes/Applicable]; [Q10(a), 
Q10(b)]=1 as applicable); ([Q10(c), Q10(d), 
Q10(f), Q10(g)]=0); Nominal [binary] variables 
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Section Variable Description 
S2 
Residence is Barracks, 
UH, or MFH 
Q10(f)=1 ([Yes/Applicable]; [Q10(a), Q10(b), 
Q10(c), Q10(d), Q10(e), Q10(g)]=0); ([Q9=(2), 
(3)] as applicable); Nominal [binary] variables 
S2 Residence is Other 
Q10(g)=1 ([None of these residence types 
apply], explanation required]; otherwise=0); 
[Q10(a), Q10(b)]=1 as applicable); ([Q10(c), 




of Barracks, UH, or MFH  
Q11; (1=Gov’t Owned/Managed; 2=PPV; 




program provider where 
assigned  
Q12; (1=USA; 2=USMC; 3=USN; 4=USAF; 
5=Unsure; 6=None; 7=Other [Brief explanation 
requested]); Categorical variable 
S3 
COVID-19 affects on 
well-being 
Q13; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S3 
COVID-19 affects on job 
performance 
Q14; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S3 
COVID-19 affects on 
health 
Q15; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S3 
COVID-19 affects on 
readiness 
Q16; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S4 
BAH provides access to 
quality housing 
Q17; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5); 
Interval variable 
S4 
Price points being similar, 
compare local civilian 
community housing 
standards and quality to 
MFH 
Q18; (Local community significantly better=1; 
Military significantly better=5); Interval 
variable 
S4 
Local area provides 
adequate access to safe, 
healthy, affordable 
housing 
Q19; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5); 
Interval variable 
S4 
New arrivals receive 
relocation assistance in 
advance of arrival 
Q20; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5); 
Interval variable 
S4 
Residence has strange 
odors, smells funny 
Q21; (Strongly agree=1; Strongly disagree=5); 
Interval variable 
S4 
HVAC receives regularly 
scheduled maintenance 
Q22; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5); 
Interval variable 
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Section Variable Description 
S4 
HVAC air filters replaced 
every 90 days or sooner 
Q23; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5); 
Interval variable 
S4 
Ceilings, walls, floors, not 
leaking, not discolored; 
paint not peeling 
Q24; (Strongly disagree=1; Strongly agree=5); 
Interval variable 
S4 
Affect residence has on 
well-being 
Q25; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S4 
Affect residence has on job 
performance 
Q26; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S4 
Affect residence has on 
health 
Q27; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S4 
Affect residence has on 
readiness 
Q28; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
S4 
Current housing/readiness 
program impacts on unit’s 
mission 
Q29; (Significant negative impact=1; 
Significant favorable impact=5); Interval 
variable 
S4 
Housing and readiness 
program affects on 
military recruitment and 
retention 
Q30; (Significantly reduces=1; Significantly 
increases=5); Interval variable 
 
 
D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
1. Introduction 
Survey response data was exported by serialized survey from the NPS-hosted 
LimeSurvey survey software as Microsoft Excel files and transferred to the NPS 
researchers’ shared drive hosted on the NPS storage area network (SAN) infrastructure 
where the survey files and data were compiled and aggregated into one workbook to 
simplify and streamline variable descriptions, generate descriptive statistics and frequency 
distribution tables, and data analysis. While unorthodox, some, but not all, Categorical 
variable descriptive statistics were provided for standardization of data, tables, and analysis 
methodology. Further, this methodology serves a purpose explained later in the study. 
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2. Analysis methodology  
The initial descriptive statistics data table was generated from the data set with 
Categorical and Nominal variable means (M) and/or rate (frequency, % of Resp, # Obs) 
for simplicity, standardization, and common data analysis practices calling for initial 
analysis of descriptive statistics data prior to Categorical and/or Nominal frequency 
distributions. This methodology also serves a purpose explained later in this chapter. 
Variable means have in large part been removed from non-Interval variables result 
discussions for clarity and accuracy related to discussion of results. 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Section Question Mean Median Mode SD Min Max 
S1 Q1 34.08 34 35 6.69 23 56 
S1 Q2 2.69 3 3 0.75 1 4 
S1 Q3(a) 6.04 6 6 1.08 4 9 
S1 Q3(b) 3.58 3 3 0.97 1 6 
S1 Q3(c) 3.57 3 3 0.79 3 5 
S1 Q4 148.56 139 67 78.59 6 386 
S1 Q5(a) 0.75 1 1 0.44 0 4 
S1 Q5(b) 2.13 2 1 1.08 1 5 
S1 Q6           26 
S2 Q7 29.66 27.5 36 10.12 12 54 
S2 Q8 0.45 0 0 0.5 0 1 
S2 Q9 1.44 1 1 0.89 1 4 
S2 Q10(a)  0.68 1 1 0.47 0 1 
S2 Q10(b) 0.19 0 0 0.39 0 1 
S2 Q10(c) 0.36 0 0 0.48 0 1 
S2 Q10(d) 0.25 0 0 0.44 0 1 
S2 Q10(e)             
S2 Q10(f) 0.13 0 0 0.33 0 1 
S2 Q10(g)             
S2 Q11 3.59 4 4 0.83 1 4 
S2 Q12 3.67 3 3 1.67 1 7 
S3 Q13 1.93 2 2 0.8 1 5 
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Section Question Mean Median Mode SD Min Max 
S3 Q14 2.42 2 2 0.87 1 5 
S3 Q15 2.63 3 3 0.71 1 4 
S3 Q16 2.44 3 3 0.76 1 4 
S4 Q17 2.76 2 2 1.47 1 5 
S4 Q18 2.7 2 2 1.38 1 5 
S4 Q19 2.82 3 4 1.32 1 5 
S4 Q20 3 3 4 1.34 1 5 
S4 Q21 4.53 5 5 0.74 3 5 
S4 Q22 3.39 4 4 1.36 1 5 
S4 Q23 2.93 3 1 1.56 1 5 
S4 Q24 3.82 4 5 1.4 1 5 
S4 Q25 3.3 3 3 1.09 1 5 
S4 Q26 3.11 3 3 0.99 1 5 
S4 Q27 3.11 3 3 0.92 1 5 
S4 Q28 3.02 3 3 0.87 1 5 
S4 Q29 2.82 3 3 0.94 1 5 
S4 Q30 2.85 3 3 1.13 1 5 
 
Table 6. Interval variables 
Section Question Mean Median Mode SD Min Max 
S1 Q1 34.1 34 35 7 23 56 
S1 Q4 148.6 139 67 79 6 386 
S1 Q5(b) 2.1 2 1 1 1 5 
S2 Q7 29.7 27.5 36 10 12 54 
S3 Q13 1.9 2 2 1 1 5 
S3 Q14 2.4 2 2 1 1 5 
S3 Q15 2.6 3 3 1 1 4 
S3 Q16 2.4 3 3 1 1 4 
S4 Q17 2.8 2 2 1 1 5 
S4 Q18 2.7 2 2 1 1 5 
S4 Q19 2.8 3 4 1 1 5 
S4 Q20 3 3 4 1 1 5 
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Section Question Mean Median Mode SD Min Max 
S4 Q21 4.5 5 5 1 3 5 
S4 Q22 3.4 4 4 1 1 5 
S4 Q23 2.9 3 1 2 1 5 
S4 Q24 3.8 4 5 1 1 5 
S4 Q25 3.3 3 3 1 1 5 
S4 Q26 3.1 3 3 1 1 5 
S4 Q27 3.1 3 3 1 1 5 
S4 Q28 3 3 3 1 1 5 
S4 Q29 2.8 3 3 1 1 5 
S4 Q30 2.8 3 3 1 1 5 
 
Question 1, survey sample mean age is approximately 34 years and one month old 
(M=34.08). Of note, one respondent (1.56% of the sample survey) selected the option to 
not provide their age.  
The median is 34 and with the minimum age of 23 and the maximum age of 56. 
Based on a sample mean age of 34, fairly higher than the normal mid 20’s average for the 
DOD (DOD, 2018a, p. 8), we would anticipate seeing higher than average ranks (Q3), 
BAH w/ Dependent types (Q5=1), and higher (Q8) mean.  
Q2 ([Categorical variable] descriptive statistics provided for standardization of 
analysis methodology as alluded to in the chapter introduction). As expected, the median 
and mode both equal to 3. Branch of service survey response are as follows. 
Table 7. Q2 response frequencies 
Branch of Service # Obs Rate (%) 
USA: 8 12.50% 
USMC: 7 10.94% 
USN: 46 71.88% 
USAF: 3 4.69% 
 
In question 3, Q3 responses were not received from Warrant Officer pay grades as 
well as “Other” category and therefore are not included in the analysis.  
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Table 8. Q3 response frequencies 
Enlisted: 
% of total 
responses Officer: 
% of total 
responses 
Officer - Prior 
Enlisted  
% of total 
responses 
E1: 0.00% O-1: 1.56% O-1E: 0.00% 
E2: 0.00% O-2: 0.00% O-2E: 0.00% 
E3: 0.00% O-3: 28.13% O-3E: 6.25% 
E4: 1.56% O-4: 12.50% O-4E: 3.13% 
E5: 10.94% O-5: 7.81% O-5E: 1.56% 
E6: 12.50% O-6: 1.56% O-6E: 0.00% 
E7: 10.94% O-7: 0.00% O-7E: 0.00% 
E8: 0.00% O-8: 0.00% O-8E: 0.00% 
E9: 1.56% O-9: 0.00% O-9E: 0.00% 
Total %:   37.50%                51.56%                     10.94% 
 
Question 3 frequencies indicate that 40 of the 64 were officers. Enlisted pay grade 
survey responses represent only about one third of the survey responses which is less than 
half of the normal average DOD Enlisted distribution (80%) of the force (Department of 
Defense, 2020).  
Both (Q4) and (Q7) survey response data were acquired in both year and month 
format. For analysis, respondent data was totaled and converted overall to months for more 
accurate data analysis. (Q4) M=148.56, or roughly 12.5 years. For Q7, the mean is 29.66 
months, or roughly 2.5 years. This aligns with normal sea/shore duty station tour 
assignments. 
Question 5 shows that 75% of total respondents have dependents, while Q6 shows 
a total of 26 different VHA zip codes for the 64 respondents. 
Question 8 responses indicate that 45% of respondents have previously purchased 
a home or residence. 
Q9, current residence description survey responses, are as follows. 
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Table 9. Q9 response frequencies 
Residence type # Obs % of Resp 
Residence in local civilian community: 51 79.69% 
Military Family Housing: 11 17.19% 
Other: 2 3.13% 
 
Q9 median and mode equal to 1, suggesting respondents are biased towards living 
in a residence located in the local civilian community (Q9=1). These results are expected 
given the DOD’s historical housing ratios of one third occupying government-provided 
quarters (i.e., Barracks, UH, MFH) with the remaining two thirds residing in a residence 
located in the local community (Lepore, 2018, p. 1). The relatively small size of the Q9 
data set provides an opportunity to demonstrate the effect of outliers on means. With nearly 
five times the next selected response it is not unreasonable to assume a mean of 1 (M=1) 
or very close 1 (versus M=1.44 per Table 5); however, M=1.44 demonstrates how means, 
being averages of the variable data, can be influenced (skewed) as a byproduct of the 
variable data. In the case of Q9, the mean was pulled upwards (nearly towards 2 if being 
rounded up (note: we are not recommending rounding means, this is for demonstration/
explanation purposes only). With the laws of central tendency being to use the median or 
mode dependent on the variable type and characteristics of the skewed data, both Q9 
median and mode equaling 1 in addition to 51 observed responses accounting for 80% of 
Q9 responses, Residence in the local civilian community is clearly the favored response. 
Q9=1 being heavily favored should correlate to a low response rate for Q10(f). Of note, 
one respondent selected the “Other” category, providing a brief description with survey 
submission, indicating the member “Owned a home in permanent address” (e.g., “Home 
of Record”) and was “...renting a room at duty station currently assigned.” This is not 
uncommon with military members whose BAQ Type is w/ Dependents (Q5)=1.  
Question 10 responses were not received for “Condominium/Townhome” [Q10(e)] 
or “Other” categories [Q10(g)] and were therefore not included in the analysis. 
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Table 10. Q10 response frequencies 
Current residence type # Obs % of Resp 
Q10(a) Rent: 41 64.1% 
Q10(b) Own: 12 18.8% 
Q10(c) Single Family Home: 23 35.9 
Q10(d) Apartment: 16 25% 
Q10(f) Barracks, UH/MFH: 8 12.5% 
 
Question 10 responses (Nominal [binary] variables) reflect a higher frequency and 
percentage of rented residences as expected with (Q8) M=0.45, less than half of the sample. 
Q11, Owning/Managing entity responses, are listed below. 
Table 11. Q11 response frequencies 
 Owning/Managing entity # Obs % of Resp 
Government Owned/Managed: 1 1.56% 
Private Developer Owned/Managed: 11 17.2% 
Unsure: 1 1.56% 
Other/Not Applicable: 51 79.69% 
 
As forecasted, Question 11 responses reflect a significantly higher selection of 
“Other/Not Appliable” ([Q11=4]; Residence in local civilian community). Q11 median and 
mode are both equal to 4. This data suggests respondents are biased towards living in a 
residence located in the local civilian community (Q9=1). These are the expected results. 
Unexpectedly, note Private Developer Owned/Managed=11, yet Q10(f)=8. Also, Q11 
“Unsure” category selected by one respondent. These disparate response anomalies suggest 
residents of military housing may not fully understand who their landlord/property 
manager is. 
Question 12 response frequencies reflect: 
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Table 12. Q12 response frequencies 
Services provided by # Obs % of Resp 
USA: 10 15.63% 
USMC: 2 3.13% 
USN: 24 37.50% 
USAF: 1 1.56% 
Unsure: 19 29.69 
Other: 2 3.13% 
None Provided: 6 9.38% 
 
Question 12 median and mode are both equal to 3, with Min=1 and Max=7. Q12 
response frequencies show USN was the most frequently observed selection at 37.5%. As 
expected based on Q2 responses, the data set suggests the sample favors the USN Service 
provider selection (for demonstrational purposes, referring back to Table 5, note Table 5 
Q12 M=3.67 (i.e., pulled upwards by the nineteen “Unsure,” two “Other,” and six “None” 
outliers; 27 responses in total, or 42.2% of N). Note, “Unsure,” “Other,” and “None 
Provided” categories account for 42.2% N. 
Q13 through Q16 are Likert scale-measured COVID-19 control questions.  
Table 13. Q13 response frequencies (with bar chart) 
 
 
Question 13 median and mode both equal to 2, favors a “Somewhat” reduction to 
respondent well-being.  
Q13. COVID-19 affects on well-being % of Resp
Significantly REDUCES: (1) 18 28.125%
Somewhat REDUCES: (2) 30 46.875%
Neither reduces nor increases: (3) 11 17.188%
Somewhat INCREASES: (4) 0 0.000%
Significantly INCREASES: (5) 1 1.563%
Do not know, No opinion, or N/A: (0) 4 6.250%
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Table 14. Q14 response frequencies (with bar chart) 
 
 
Q14 median and mode are both equal to 2, demonstrating a bias towards a 
“Somewhat” reduction to job performance, albeit not demonstrated as strongly as Q13.  
Table 15. Q15 response frequencies (with bar chart) 
 
 
Question 15 median and mode equal to 3, with Min=1 with Max=4, has a narrower 
response dispersion than Q14 suggesting the sample favors a neutral respondent response 
regarding COVID-19 impacts to health.  
Table 16. Q16 response frequencies (with bar chart) 
 
 
Q14. COVID-19 affects on job performance % of Resp
Significantly REDUCES: (1) 6 9.375%
Somewhat REDUCES: (2) 30 46.875%
Neither reduces nor increases: (3) 19 29.688%
Somewhat INCREASES: (4) 3 4.688%
Significantly INCREASES: (5) 2 3.125%
Do not know, No opinion, or N/A: (0) 4 6.250%
Q15. COVID-19 affects on health % of Resp
Significantly REDUCES: (1) 5 7.813%
Somewhat REDUCES: (2) 15 23.438%
Neither reduces nor increases: (3) 37 57.813%
Somewhat INCREASES: (4) 3 4.688%
Significantly INCREASES: (5) 0 0.000%
Do not know, No opinion, or N/A: (0) 4 6.250%
Q16. COVID-19 affects on readiness % of Resp
Significantly REDUCES: (1) 8 12.500%
Somewhat REDUCES: (2) 21 32.813%
Neither reduces nor increases: (3) 31 48.438%
Somewhat INCREASES: (4) 2 3.125%
Significantly INCREASES: (5) 0 0.000%
Do not know, No opinion, or N/A: (0) 2 3.125%
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Question 16 consists of a median and mode both equal to 3, with Min=1 and 
Max=4, suggesting a “Somewhat reduction” in respondent readiness as the result of 
COVID-19 impacts.  
Q17 BAH providing access to quality housing, with M=2.76, has both median and 
mode equal to 2, suggesting a “Neutral” sample response. SD=1.47. These data suggest the 
data set is skewed and will likely require further analysis. To evaluate and confirm or deny 
this need, Q17 Categorical responses were evaluated: 
Table 17. Q17 response frequencies 
Likert Scale BAH provides access to quality housing % of Resp 
Strongly disagree (1) 16 25.00% 
Somewhat disagree (2) 17 26.56% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
(3) 5 7.81% 
Somewhat agree (4) 14 21.88% 
Strongly agree (5) 10 15.63% 
Do not know, No opinion, 
N/A (0) 2 3.13% 
 
Eliminating the non-score factors (3) and (0) for Q17, Q17 “Disagree” 
responses=52% of responses, whereas Q17 “Agree” responses=38%. Further analysis will 
be required.  
Question 18 descriptive response data being comparable to Q17, with SD=1.38, 
likewise suggests a “Neutral” response. Therefore, further analysis will be required. 
Q19 mean (M=2.82) sample responses suggest favoring a “Neutral” sample 
response yet consists of a median equal to 3 and a mode equal to 4. These data suggest Q19 
responses favor a “Neutral” response but will be further evaluated.  
Q20, with mean of 3, median equaling 3, and mode equal to 4 and SD=1.34 suggests 
a “Neutral” response.  
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Question 21, “My residence has a strange odor” was reverse-scored as required for 
the survey format and methodology. Q21 mean (4.53), with both median and mode equal 
to 5, with Min=3, Max=5, heavily favored the “Strongly disagree” response. Q22 mean 
(3.39), with median and mode both equal to 4, SD=1.36, favors a “Neutral” to “Somewhat 
Agree” response. 
Question 23 mean (M=2.93) favors “Neutral.” However, median is equal to 3 and 
mode is equal to 1 suggesting this data is skewed. SD=1.56, Min=1, Max=5. Evaluate if 
further analysis will be necessary. 
Table 18. Q23 response frequencies 
Scale Air filters replaced 3 months or < % of Resp 
Strongly disagree (1) 15 23.44% 
Somewhat disagree (2) 10 15.63% 
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 5 7.81% 
Somewhat agree (4) 12 18.75% 
Strongly agree (5) 12 18.75% 
Do not know, No opinion, N/A 
(0) 10 15.63% 
 
Eliminating the non-score factors (3) and (0), “Disagree” responses=39.06% of 
Q23 responses whereas “Agree” responses=37.50%. Confirmed, further analysis will be 
required.  
Question 24 mean (M=3.82) strongly suggests a “Somewhat agree” response. Q24 
median equal to 4 and mode equal to 5, SD=1.40, confirms this suggestion. Q25 M=3.30, 
with both median and mode equal to 3 strongly suggest a “Neutral” response. Questions 
26 and 27 M=3.11, with both median and mode equal to 3, with SD=0.99, 0.92, firmly 
suggest a “Neutral” response. Q28 through Q30, with means ([Q28, M=3.02]; [Q29, 
M=2.82]; [Q30, M=2.85]) with both median and mode equal to 3, with respective standard 
deviations ([Q28, SD=0.87]; [Q29, SD=0.94]; [Q30, SD=1.13]), strongly suggest 
“Neutral.” 
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E. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Survey responses information provided data for two primary groups: 
1. Residents of local civilian community housing (LCCH); and, 
2. Residents of on-base housing (i.e., Barracks, UH, MFH); “MFH” for brevity.  
The preferred statistical analysis tool for evaluating the difference between two 
variables is the T-test, the two variables being residents of LCCH, and residents of MHF. 
related to the accuracy of the T-test’s summary statistics is predicated on four commonly 
known and understood T-test assumptions codified in the following statistician technical 
language: 
1. Scale of measurement; that the scale of measurement is applied to the data 
follows a continuous and consistent scale, such as the scores for an IQ test. 
2. Simple random sample; the data collected is from a representative, randomly 
selected portion of the total population.  
3. Normal distribution; when the data is plotted it forms a normal bell-shaped 
distribution curve (a must for central rule of tendency to be applicable). 
4. Homogeneity of variance; equal variance exists when the standard deviations of 
the samples are approximately the same. 
Microsoft Excel allows for t-testing of two-samples assuming either equal, or 
unequal variances, depending on the sample being tested, but the default is typically 
assuming unequal variances. 
Survey results were segregated into two subsamples: 1) LCCH, and 2) MFH to 
ensure accurate selection of Variable 1 (LCCH) and Variable 2 (MFH) input ranges. Two-
sample t-Tests assuming unequal variances was performed on applicable survey questions. 
Test Hypothesized Mean Difference was set to “0” with labels selected and Alpha set to 
0.05 for a 95% confidence interval (CI). T-Test data table is provided below. Results are 
as follows for Interval variables beginning with Question #1. 
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Q1 t-statistic is -1.223 with 26 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
0.232, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between means; the LCCH & MFH subsample populations do not have 
intrinsic differences with regard to age. Question 4 t-statistic is -0.778 with 23 degrees of 
freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.445, which is much greater than Alpha 0.05. It is 
safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between means. Q5(b) t-
statistic for # of Dependents is -1.752 with 16 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-
value is 0.099, which is slightly greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between means.  
Question 7 t-statistic for length of duty assignment is 1.384 with 20 degrees of 
freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.182, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe 
to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between means; the LCCH & 
MFH subsample populations have no intrinsic differences.  
Q13 t-statistic is 0.888 with 27 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
0.382, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between means; the LCCH & MFH subsample populations have no 
intrinsic differences. Q14 t-statistic for COVID-19 affects to job performance is 2.039 with 
16 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.058, which is marginally greater 
than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between means. Q15 t-statistic is -0.287 with 12 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-
value is 0.779, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between means. The differences are not statistically significant. 
Q16 t-statistic is -0.497 with 14 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.627, 
which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between means. The differences are not statistically significant. 
Q17 t-statistic for BAH providing access to quality housing is -0.561 with 13 
degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.584, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. 
It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between means. Q18 t-
statistic is -1.089 with 16 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.292, which 
is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
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difference between means of LCCH & MFH subsample populations for Q18. Q19 t-
statistic is -1.089 with 16 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.292, which 
is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between means.  
Q20 t-statistic -1.428 with 19 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
0.169, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between means of the LCCH & MFH subsample populations. Q21 t-
statistic for residence has odors or smells funny is -0.775 with 14 degrees of freedom. The 
corresponding p-value is 0.451, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between means of the LCCH & MFH subsample 
populations. Q22 t-statistic is -1.0450 with 23 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-
value is 0.307, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between means of the LCCH & MFH subsample populations. 
Q23 t-statistic for replacing HVAC filters every 90 days or sooner is 2.263 with 17 
degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.037, which is less than Alpha 0.05, 
which provides statistically significant evidence that the subsample differ between means 
is not limited only due to their intrinsic differences. Reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference between the means of the two subsamples. 
Q24 t-statistic is -0.644 with 13 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
0.530, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between means of the LCCH & MFH subsample populations. Q25 t-
statistic is 0.096 with 14 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.925, which is 
greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between means. Q26 t-statistic is 1.089 with 15 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-
value is 0.293, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between means of the two groups. 
Q27 t-statistic is 0.450 with 15 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
0.659, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference between means of the LCCH & MFH subsample populations. Q28 t-statistic 
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is 0.419 with 14 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.682, which is greater 
than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between means. Q29 t-statistic is 0.085 with 17 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-
value is 0.933, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between means. 
Q30 t-statistic is -0.255 with 23 degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
0.801, which is greater than Alpha 0.05. It is safe to not reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between means of the LCCH & MFH subsample populations. 
1. Independent Sample T-Test Assuming Unequal Variances 
Table 19. Comparing local civilian community housing (LCCH) to military 
family housing (MFH) resident survey responses 
Survey information LCCH  MFH     
P(T<=t) 
two-tail   
Section Question Variable M   M   df t p 
      (s) (s)       
      n n       
S1 Q1 Age (in years) 33.75  35.64  26  ‐1.223  0.232 
    7.12  3.93        
    52  11          
S1 Q4 
Length of 
Service  146.02  160.82  23  ‐0.778  0.445 
      83.41  50.37         
      53  11         
S1 Q5(b) # of Dependents 1.97  2.64  16  ‐1.752  0.099 
      1.04  1.12        
      37  11         
S2 Q7 Duty 
assignment tour 
length 
30.28  26.64  20  1.384  0.182 
    10.56  7.30        
      53  11        
S3 Q13 COVID-19 
affects on well-
being 
1.96  1.80  27  0.888  0.382 
    0.86  0.42          
      50  10          
S3 Q14 2.50  2.00  16  2.039  0.058 
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Survey information LCCH  MFH     
P(T<=t) 
two-tail   
Section Question Variable M   M   df t p 
      (s) (s)       
      n n       
    
COVID-19 
affects on job 
performance 0.89  0.67          
      50  10          
S3 Q15 COVID-19 
affects on health 
2.62  2.70  12  ‐0.287  0.779 
    0.70  0.82          
      50  10          
S3 Q16 COVID-19 
affects on 
readiness 
2.41  2.55  14  ‐0.497  0.627 
    0.75  0.82        
      51  11        
S4 Q17 BAH provides 
access to quality 
housing 
2.71  3.00  13  ‐0.561  0.584 
    1.47  1.49          
    52  10          
S4 Q18 Comparison: 
LCCH to MFH 
2.60  3.09  16  ‐1.089  0.292 
    1.40  1.30          
      43  11          






2.82  2.80  14  0.054  0.957 
    1.35  1.23          
    51  10          





2.88  3.45  19  ‐1.428  0.169 
    1.38  1.13          
    42  11          
S4 Q21 Residence has 
strange odors 
4.57  4.36  14  0.775  0.451 
    0.73  0.81          
      51  11          




3.34  3.67  23  ‐1.045  0.307 
    1.45  0.71        
    50  9        
S4 Q23 3.11  2.10  17  2.263  0.037 
    1.59  1.20        
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Survey information LCCH  MFH     
P(T<=t) 
two-tail   
Section Question Variable M   M   df t p 
      (s) (s)       
      n n       
    
HVAC air filters 
replaced < every 
90 days 44  10        





3.76  4.09  13  ‐0.644  0.530 
    1.36  1.58          
    
50  11 
        
S4 Q25 Affect residence 
has on well-
being 
3.31  3.27  14  0.096  0.925 
    1.09  1.10          
      52  11          
S4 Q26 Affect residence 
has on job 
performance 
3.17  2.82  15  1.089  0.293 
    0.98  0.98          
      52  11          
S4 Q27 Affect residence 
has on health 
3.13  3.00  15  0.450  0.659 
    0.93  0.89          
      52  11          
S4 Q28 Affect residence 
has on readiness 
3.04  2.91  14  0.419  0.682 
    0.86  0.94          
      52  11          





2.83  2.80  17  0.085  0.933 
    0.98  0.79          
    
40  10 
        






2.83  2.91  23  ‐0.255  0.801 
    1.20  0.83        
    
41  11 





V. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results of this study are not generalizable due to the sample survey not 
acquiring the requisite amount of completed surveys. To establish a 95% confidence 
interval (CI), the survey sample required was 383 (N=383). Total completed surveys 
received was 64 (N=64), a 7% response rate, 16.71% of the required (N). 
Question 3 frequencies indicated that 40 of the 64 respondents were officers. 
Enlisted pay grade survey responses represented only about one third of the survey 
responses which is less than half of the normal average DOD Enlisted distribution (80%) 
of the force (Department of Defense, 2020). The officer-biased survey response rate can 
be explained by analyzing the source of the officer survey responses given the study’s 
survey methodology called for the researcher to identify each survey generated with its 
own unique serialization. The officer-biased results are largely attributed to NPS being 
included in the survey (i.e., a byproduct of NPS’ military population consisting mostly of 
officers). 
Q6 responses showed a total of 26 different VHA Zip Codes were provided by the 
64 respondents (from six of the nine U.S. Census Bureau divisions). Respondents were 
asked to provide the VHA Zip for their assigned duty location (per LES). Many [most] 
respondents provided a Zip Code other than their assigned duty station’s Zip Code, which 
is presumed to be the respondent’s home, or mailing Zip Code. While it is not within this 
study’s scope to evaluate the mean distance (in miles) that service members are living from 
their assigned duty stations, acquiring the respondent’s residential Zip Code could provide 
insight to support further evaluation and analysis of Q19 responses as it relates to 
determining if service members are traveling further from their assigned duty stations to 
find appropriate housing; e.g., within 30 miles and a one hour commute one-way 
(Reishauer, 1993, p. 4). Another consideration regarding Zip Codes is that the respondent 
might not actually “work” at the ultimate duty station listed in their orders; reassignment 
to a detachment or subordinate unit is very common.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
For future studies, specifically surveys, consider including various Zip Code 
inquiries such as:  
1) VHA Zip (per LES): to ensure identification of ultimate duty station. 
2) Home, or residence zip code: To establish respondent’s housing area; much 
information can be gained through U.S. Census Bureau and other resources that are directly 
relevant to DOD policy (e.g., crime rates, critical housing market areas, etc., much of this 
is evaluated and/or taken consideration during periodical MHA assessment). 
3) Duty location zip code (if assigned other than ultimate duty station; per unit 
mailing address). 
Note: Some surveys have respondents provide their travel distance (in miles) and 
the commute time (in minutes). We advise utilizing these methodologies in addition to 
acquiring the actual location demographics; e.g., mailing address, zip code. 
While length of tour assignment (Q7) has not yet been emphasized in this study, 
we take this opportunity now in the conclusion. Length of tour assignment is an important 
and very relevant factor service members take into consideration in the home-buying or 
home-renting decision-making process (Bond et al., 2016, pp. 77–78). Studies 
commissioned by the department have shown home ownership also improves service 
member and military family QoL (Bissell et al., 2010; Marsh, 1995; Reishauer, 1993). 
Given the DOD has control over service member tour length assignments, this 
factor must be considered and evaluated. RAND’s 2016 study: “Tour Lengths, Permanent 
Changes of Station, and Alternatives for Savings and Improved Stability,” weighing length 
of tour assignment more heavily as compared to a standard equal weight distribution 
analysis may render more accurate results (Bond et al., 2016). The DOD has long 
considered adjusting the length of both “sea-duty” and “shore-duty” assignments as a cost 
saving measure for curtailing permanent change of station (PCS) related costs as well as 
improving service member and family QoL. Assume the DOD’s CONUS tour assignment 
policy stipulates six-year “area” assignments. Assume service member’s orders were six-
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year orders versus three. For example, using current detailing practices: Instead of 
receiving one set of three-year orders, the service member would receive two sets of three-
year orders; the first three-year orders are to the primary duty station, and the second set of 
three-year orders are to the follow-on tour). The service member could be attached to a 
sea-duty platform within the same geographical duty location for three of the six years. 
Following completion of that tour, the service member would detach the sea duty 
assignment and report to the shore-duty platform assignment that is located within the same 
geographical location as the sea duty assignment for the other remaining three years of the 
service member’s assigned tour. As it is the DOD’s policy to look first to house their 
service members in available and suitable housing in the local civilian community located 
within commuting distance of the installation assigned (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2010a, p. 2). How much more likely 
would service members be to purchase homes located in the local communities versus 
renting if this were the policy of the DOD? Recall 66% of the DOD already leverages local 
communities for housing. Could a policy change such as this drastically change the service 
member’s behavior and decision-making to favor purchasing a home versus renting? If so, 
would this change be large enough that it essentially absolves the DOD of the MFH 
responsibility apart from the few remote outlying areas where the local MHA cannot 
support housing the force?  
This is not to say that order modifications and other unusual or episodic events will 
not require attention or that there are no drawbacks whatsoever if six-year MHA 
assignments were the DOD’s policy, but those circumstances likely cannot be avoided 
regardless the situation; therefore, these issues and circumstances should not have any 
weight or bearing on the matter unless they can be validated, justified, and quantified. 
Using the substantial cost-avoidance benefits from six-year MHA assignments as 
an example, the DOD stands to avoid tens of thousands of dollars with each set of reduced 
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) orders. These costs can be significant, staggering even 
when considering the overall PCS costs of moving a military family of three, four, or more 
across the United States, in addition to their household goods (HHG), personal belongings, 
personally owned vehicles (POV), etc.  
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Additionally, factor in the lost man-hours that will be regained that are normally 
associated with the service member checking out from the detaching command, pack-out 
HHGs, disenrolling children from the detaching MHA school, travel time to the next duty 
station, per diem costs during PCS travel for lodging, meals, and incidental expenses 
(M&IE), checking into the new command, time away from work to accept delivery and 
unpacking HHGs, reenrolling children in school, spouse employment in the new duty 
station, the eventual and unavoidable follow-on HHGs claim for items lost, missing , 
broken or damaged by the Transportation Service Provider (TSP) that moved the family’s 
personal effects from the previous duty station to the next, etc. Studies show these issues 
matter and have standing in the service member’s and military family’s evaluation and 
valuation of QoL and could therefore be a powerful resource maximization capability. 
Question 8 responses indicating that 45% of respondents had previously purchased 
a home or residence could be largely influenced by history of duty assignment location. 
Example being, it is likely that, on average, less service members purchase homes in 
California or other similarly priced critical housing areas. 
In her testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Ms. Elizabeth Field 
briefly mentioned that the GAO determined the purported 87% privatized military housing 
tenant satisfaction score was inaccurate and completely unreliable due to the manner in 
which the score was arrived at (GAO on privatized housing, 2019). Q9 responses provided 
an excellent opportunity to demonstrate why and how it matters how these data and other 
survey data are analyzed, summarized, aggregated, and counted. 
While we provided all descriptive statistics for all survey questions for simplicity 
and standardization, it should be noted that descriptive statistics are not commonly utilized 
to analyze or summarize Categorical variable results. However, as alluded to in the 
paragraph above, based on the information reported by Ms. Field, it was the researchers’ 
opinion that the utilization of all Q9 data, descriptive statistics, in addition to normally 
reported and evaluated Categorical variable response frequencies and distributions, was 
beneficial in demonstrating how these data could be misinterpreted or errantly counted and/
or aggregated, leading to inaccurate data being reported. For example, Q9, a Categorical 
variable, and explaining the causation for Q9’s mean (M=1.44) being pulled upwards 
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towards 2 because of the outlier effects of “MFH” as well as “Other” option categories 
(consequently why Q9 median and mode being equal to 1 are more accurate measures of a 
“mean” value). Regarding Q9 results, 80% (51 # obs) of respondents identifying with 
residing in a residence in the local civilian community, and only 17% (11 # obs) of 
respondents residing in MFH, with 3% (2 # obs) choosing “Other” category, is noteworthy 
given the historical 66% of service members living out in town with approximately 33% 
residing in on-base housing (barracks, UH/MFH) (Lepore, 2018, p. 1). The researchers 
suspect these non-traditional response results are most likely explainable as being a 
byproduct of the sample being officer-biased (note there were no “Barracks/UH” category 
selections). 
Question 11 responses returned unexpected results with ([Q11; Private Developer 
Owned/Managed]=11), yet ([Q10(f)]=8). Also, Q11 “Unsure” category was selected by 
one respondent. It is important to understand the implications associated with these 
disparate response anomalies suggesting that residents of military housing may not fully 
understand who their landlord/property manager is. Briefly discussed in this study’s 
literature review, if residents of on-base housing (MFH, to include barracks/UH) cannot 
distinguish between the Government Housing Representatives/Advocates and the 
employees that work directly for the Private Developer (i.e., Privatized Housing 
contractors), whose performance are residents of military provided quarters evaluating and 
grading when participating in the annual housing survey? While this study’s survey did not 
obtain responses from barracks/UH occupants, it is worth noting for reader awareness and 
understanding that many barracks and UH facilities utilized by the military have also been 
privatized. As discussed in Chapter I Limitations, barracks/UH was not the focus of this 
study and therefore why barracks/UH is not covered in more detail in this study. 
Similarly to Q9, Question 12’s analysis provided an opportunity and discussion 
related to bias and skewed data, means, mode, and median. Mentioned in Q12’s analysis 
but not further discussed was the noteworthiness of the “Unsure,” “Other,” and “None 
Provided” categories accounting for 42.2% of the sample (N). We digress for a moment 
for emphasis to reiterate points from Questions 1 through Q5, this survey sample is senior 
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to the DOD average in age, rank, length of military service, etc. (essentially, senior across 
the board). 
This is a very important statistic and finding of this study. Q12 “Unsure,” “Other,” 
and “None Provided” categories account for 42.2% of the survey sample (N). This survey 
sample is senior across the board to the average ADSM. Yet, when asked who at the local 
installation level where they are assigned is providing critical readiness program support 
and services, nearly half of the survey respondents responded: “Unsure”(29.69%), 
“Other”(3.13%), or believe “None [are] Provided” (9.38%). 
As it relates to Ms. Field’s testimony (GAO on privatized housing, 2019), DOD 
officials have frequently referred to historically referenced privatized military housing 
tenant satisfaction survey scores of 87%, and a 93% privatized military housing occupancy 
rate both being readily evident measures of military tenant satisfaction with privatized 
housing. It would seem these purported metrics and results have been relied upon for years, 
if not decades. Based on the current understanding that this data was inaccurate, in fact 
wildly inaccurate according to Ms. Field’s testimony, the inherent questions that follows 
are: Who is/was responsible, if anyone, to verify and validate these reported measurements, 
scores, and indicators of satisfaction? Presumably the next question: For how long have 
the tax-paying American public that is footing the MHPI bill and the DOD been defrauded 
and misguided by this misinformation? 
Another benefit and potential significant result of this study involves respondent 
responses to Questions 13 through Question 16; the COVID-19 control questions (Section 
3 Questions). In summary, and as it relates to the combat effectiveness of the joint force, 
our study finds this survey sample, on average, perceived COVID-19 had little to no effect 
on their well-being, job performance, health, and readiness. 
For clarification and to be specifically clear, it should be noted that for Q13(well-
being) and Q14(job performance) “Somewhat reduces” was the most frequently selected 
response; however, on average, the sample responded neutrally to COVID-19 effects. 
Q13 through Q16 descriptive statistics and T-Statistic results are listed below: 
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Question 13 mean (M=1.93), with both a median and mode equal to 2, strongly 
favors a “Somewhat” reduction to respondent well-being. Q14 M=2.42, median and mode 
being equal to 2, demonstrates a “Somewhat” reduction to job performance, albeit not 
demonstrated as strongly as Question 13. Question 15 mean (M=2.63) having both a 
median and mode equal to 3 and Min=1 with Max=4 has a narrower response dispersion 
than Q14 suggesting the sample favoring a neutral respondent response regarding COVID-
19 impacts to health. Question 16 mean (M=2.44) consisting of a median and mode both 
equal to 3 and Min=1 with Max=4 suggests a “Somewhat reduction” in respondent 
readiness as the result of COVID-19 impacts.  
Question 17 mean (M=2.76), BAH providing access to quality housing, suggests a 
“Neutral” sample response. However, both median and mode are lower, equaling 
2(SD=1.47). These data suggest the data set is skewed and will likely require further 
analysis. To evaluate this need Q17 Categorical responses were evaluated.  
Table 20. Q17 response frequencies (further analysis) 
Scale 
BAH provides access to 
quality housing % of Resp 
Strongly disagree (1) 16 25.00% 
Somewhat disagree (2) 17 26.56% 
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 5 7.81% 
Somewhat agree (4) 14 21.88% 
Strongly agree (5) 10 15.63% 
Do not know, No opinion, N/A (0) 2 3.13% 
 
Eliminating the non-score factors (3) and (0), “Disagree” responses=52% of Q17 
responses whereas “Agree” responses=38%. Further analysis will be required.  
Question 23 asked respondents if their residence’s HVAC filters were replaced 
every 90 days or sooner. Q23 provided the most “statistically significant” findings of the 
study thus far, from the t-Statistic tests performed on the interval variables after segregating 
the survey sample into two subsamples, those that live in local community housing 
(LCCH), and MFH tenants. 
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Q23 mean (M=2.93) favors “Neutral.” However, median is equal to 3 and mode is 
equal to 1 suggesting this data is skewed (SD=1.56). Min=1, Max=5. Further analysis will 
be necessary: 
Eliminating the non-score factors (3) and (0), “Disagree” responses=39.06% of 
Q23 responses whereas “Agree” responses=37.50%. Confirmed, further analysis will be 
required.  
Table 21. Q23 response frequencies (further analysis) 
Scale Air filters replaced 3 months or < % of Resp 
Strongly disagree (1) 15 23.44% 
Somewhat disagree (2) 10 15.63% 
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 5 7.81% 
Somewhat agree (4) 12 18.75% 
Strongly agree (5) 12 18.75% 
Do not know, No opinion, N/A (0) 10 15.63% 
 
Q23 t-statistic for replacing HVAC filters every 90 days or sooner is 2.263 with 17 
degrees of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.037, which is less than Alpha 0.05, 
which provides statistically significant evidence that the subsample difference between 
means is not limited only due to their intrinsic differences. Reject the null hypothesis. 
In keeping with the purpose of this study, recommendation methodology 
incorporates categorizing recommendations per the study’s purpose. The study had 
intended to provide a variety of recommendations outlined and categorized IAW the NDS 
LOE which the recommendation most accurately aligned with and supported but due to 
time constraints these intentions are not possible at this time but will be maintained in 
rough form to support further research and inquiries should they come to fruition. 
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C. STUDY PURPOSE 
(1) Identify and prioritize key policies 
Referring to Figures 1, 2, and 3, there are nearly 50 references listed between DODI 
4165.63 DOD Housing and DODM 4165.63 DOD Housing Management Manual, the 
order and format to Chapter II Literature Review, [section] B. Policy, is not by chance. The 
policies and references are drawn from the near 50 refences and are listed in order of 
priority established by this study. The researchers conducting this study believe 
establishing this prioritization is important to ensure all stake holders (e.g., unit and 
installation leadership, decision-makers, policymakers, program managers, and occupants 
of housing) understand which policies take precedence in the event policies conflict or 
stakeholders are faced with difficult decisions regarding resource management and 
utilization. 
(2) Measurement tools and identification of common causal factors related to 
negative impacts to service member and family health, well-being, and 
readiness 
The survey instrument itself is a product produced by the study and researchers to 
assist with measurement and achievement of policy objective desired end states. The 
survey instrument is policy-based and strategically developed to remove or mitigate 
subjectivity when used for evaluation to acquire accurate and actionable data related to 
occupant health, well-being, and readiness with the intrinsic benefit of serving as a rubric 
to gauge achievement of current housing and readiness policies. Succinctly the study’s 
survey instrument could easily be used by housing tenants, providers, and support staff as 
a near-definitive diagnostic physical inspection tool to identify physically observable 
indicators and building assemblage characteristics commonly observed, known, and 
associated with unsafe and unhealthy housing conditions. Standardized values and/or 
grading systems and criteria need to be established. 
Issues and concerns related to needing but not having accurate data has been 
consistently raised and discussed in great detail in each of the four congressional hearings 
on privatized military housing. The nucleus for much of the data relative to the MHPI 
projects is the maintenance and service data (i.e., the work order history). Not having 
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accurate maintenance and service data negatively affects all four metrics mentioned by the 
GAO that the services use to gauge MHPI project success (Lepore, 2018): 
 maintenance management 
 resident satisfaction 
 project safety 
 financial management 
An example to demonstrate how one maintenance issue or work order can easily 
affect and influence the other three areas of measurement: Consider a water leak, 
presumably the result of a failed plumbing component. The military housing occupant who 
just took possession of the housing unit notices wet flooring in the area of a bathroom base 
cabinet and places a work order for a water leak in the electronic work order system based 
on what they observed. Maintenance arrives within one hour of the tenant placing the work 
order and identifies the source of the leak: a corroded and deteriorated rubber gasket in a 
plumbing fitting, and replaces the fitting, closes the work order, and is on with the day. The 
following day, the occupant checks the area to validate a complete repair and does not 
notice any leaks or signs of water, and therefore assumes the issue has been resolved.  
Two days later, the occupant notices water on the floor in the same area and places 
another work order for a water leak. Assume at this time the source of the leak is correctly 
located and identified; the source of the water leak is an ill-fitted and incorrectly installed 
sink drain and P-trap assembly. Through reflection, the occupant and maintenance staff 
learn and understand what led to the incorrect identification of the source of the water leak 
and the assumption that corrective action and repair had taken place. The day of the week 
of the original identification of the issue and work order was on a Friday, the last day of 
the work week. The water that had leaked onto the floor was a byproduct of the spouse of 
the housing occupant preparing for work first thing in the morning. Following the 
purported repair, the next day when the housing occupant evaluated the same area for any 
signs of water as an indication that the leak had not been repaired, was a Saturday, and the 
following day Sunday. While the leak still occurred when the spouse used the sink, the leak 
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was not as significant nor noticed due to the change in routines between the work week 
and the weekend. Come Monday and resumption of normal work week routines, the mater 
of the leak not being appropriately identified and repaired comes to light.  
This example, noting that the housing occupants just took possession of the housing 
unit, begs the question, “How long has the leak been occurring for unnoticed or unreported, 
potentially assuming the water on the floor was just a matter of splashed or spilled water 
from normal routines?” If for an extended time, weeks, or months, or longer, not only could 
serious health implications potentially come into play as a result environmental and 
biological issues developing (Environmental Protection Agency, 2014b), but the condition 
of the home could be severely, even detrimentally affected. These results can implicate and 
influence not only Resident satisfaction measurements but largely influence Project safety 
as well as Financial management measurement areas depending on the extent and severity 
of the leak, environmental and biological concerns, structural damage requiring demolition 
and reconstruction of building assemblages following abatement of the moisture related 
incident caused by the leak, etc.  
It is for these reasons that this study had conclusively determined the government 
cannot outsource but must own, manage, maintain, and standardize an Enterprise 
maintenance software program to ensure tracking and historical record archiving to ensure 
these type measures are accurately captured and maintained. Fortunately, included in the 
near 50 references included in Figures 1, 2, and 3, is DODD 4165.06 – Real Property, 
which stipulates policy requirements for the branches of the military services to capture 
this type data on the DOD’s behalf ISO property and asset management initiatives (Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, 2004). 
Based on the overwhelming data included in GAO reports, DODIG reports, 
congressional hearings and testimony, etc., specifically citing government’s need for 
accurate and reliable data across a spectrum of policy-based requirements, in addition to 
needing to have data and facts available to hold a MHPI project provider accountable for 
substandard performance in the least, the need, rather the requirement for the government 
and/or DOD to have and provide a government owned and government controlled, 
supported, and managed asset and maintenance work order management system, or 
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database, is unequivocally a requirement if there are reasonable expectations for lasting 
program improvements to the MHPI and housing in general.  
Fortunately, many of these systems are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) available 
systems; they are no different than purchasing a software use license for Microsoft Office 
or other program. Immediate benefits include the government having control of 
architecture naming conventions, work order processing and required notifications in the 
event of health or safety related matters, real-time monitoring of work order processing, 
input, submission, updates by maintenance staff, as well as the closing of the work order 
and establishment of required or recommended notes to be input by the maintenance staff, 
etc. These are just a few of the myriads of data point and system management benefits.  
Lastly, reporting. A standardized reporting system needs to be used for all services 
to use as it relates to issues related to personnel and barracks, UH, and MFH. 
All services are required to report various instances of other personnel matters up 
their respective chains of command. Examples of instances are those related to domestic 
violence, suicide, casualty assistance, information “spillage,” both classified information 
or personal identifiable information or private health information, etc. The USN’s directive 
on operational report requirements such as this is OPNAVINST F3100.6 (series).  
Given much of the housing, health, and habitability-related matters discussed in the 
congressional hearings and testimony centered on issues that were a result of a residence 
that had one or multiple maintenance or repair issues for water leaks or some form of water 
ingress, it seems prudent for the DOD to adopt a policy that regarded all water leak or water 
ingress related work orders as “reportable incidents” comparable to other Commander 
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) such as suicidal ideation, suicidal gestures, 
domestic violence, safety, etc. This reporting requirement could facilitate the DOD taking 
a proactive approach to getting ahead of the problem both in reporting as well as increasing 
awareness. The survey instrument is included as an appendix to further assist and guide 
service members and their families with inspecting and documenting issues and concerns 
with their residence regardless the location.  
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APPENDIX. HOUSING, HEALTH, AND READINESS SURVEY 
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